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groups.operations· Modern· 2015 – 2024

Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war

Russian military operation beginning in September 2015

From September 2015 until December 2024, Russia conducted a military intervention in the Syrian civil war, following a request by Ba'athist Syria under Bashar al-Assad for support against the Syrian opposition and Islamic State (IS). The Russian Armed Forces' first conflict beyond the former Soviet Union since its dissolution; analysts pointed to strategic aims including limiting United States influence in the Middle East, access to the Eastern Mediterranean, and military capacity for other theaters of the Middle East, such as the Red Sea and Libya. Pre-intervention, government forces controlled 26% of Syria. Russian involvement had included diplomatic support for Assad and billions of US dollars' worth of materiel for the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. The intervention began with airstrikes focused on Free Syrian Army militias. Russian ground support included special forces, advisors and private military companies like the Wagner Group. Russia declared the strikes a "war against terrorism", but used scorched earth methods against civilians. Putin defined Russia's goals as "stabilising the legitimate power in Syria and creating the conditions for political compromise", while a speculated aim was capturing territories from US-UK-Arab-backed militias. Syrian territory under Assad's control shrank from 26% to 17% by 2017. By January 2017, the Russian Air Force was claimed to have carried out 19,160 air combat missions, delivering 71,000 strikes. In 2016, over 80% of strikes targeted opposition militias fighting IS. The intervention saw concrete gains for the Assad government from late 2016 to 2020: the recapture of Aleppo from the Army of Conquest, and Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor from IS in 2017, the 2018 Southern offensive, and the North-Western offensive. In December 2017, Russia announced its troops would be deployed to Syria permanently. The air campaign until 2018 was characterized by three ranges. Long Range Aviation and the Black Sea Fleet used Kh-101 and Kalibr missiles respectively. Mid-range strikes used Su-24 and Su-34 tactical bombers. Close air support included Su-25s and Mil Mi-24 helicopters. By April 2018, Russian airstrikes reportedly killed over 7,700 civilians, about a quarter of them children, apart from 4,749 opposition fighters and 4,893 IS fighters. International and human rights bodies accused Russia of committing war crimes, targeting civilians, hospitals, schools, carpet bombing, and double tap strikes on relief workers. Weapons used included unguided bombs, cluster bombs, incendiaries similar to white phosphorus and thermobaric weapons. Countries with ties to Russia, as well as Israel, Jordan and Egypt, either voiced support or stayed neutral. The US, UK and France, as well as Turkey and most Gulf states, condemned the Russian intervention, Russian war crimes, and complicity with the Ba'athist Syria's war crimes. The US imposed economic sanctions against Russia. In November 2024, amid the dramatically escalated Russo-Ukrainian war, a renewal of Russian airstrikes failed to halt sweeping Syrian opposition offensives against government forces. Russia began to withdraw forces, by then consisting of special forces, base security and an aviation unit, and the fall of the Assad regime followed in December.

Background and preparation phase

The Syrian civil war has been waged since 2011 between multiple opposition (anti-Assad) groups and the government as well, including their local and foreign support bases. Since 2014, much Syrian territory had been claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS) an entity internationally recognized as a terrorist organization. In the north-west of the country, the main opposition factions included the Revolutionary Command Council and the Islamic Army of Conquest coalition. Free Syrian militias that operated under the joint RCC command centre that answered to the Syrian Interim Government were being trained, vetted and equipped by United States and allies. Since September 2014, the U.S.-led CJTF coalition had begun direct intervention in Syria as part of its war against IS. The Wall Street Journal reported in January 2015 that coalition airstrikes were unsuccessful in slowing IS advances in Syria. Following his successful annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and the temporary freezing of the war in Donbas, Vladimir Putin turned his attention to Syria in 2015. Russian intelligence reports estimated that Assad government forces effectively controlled a meagre 10% of Syrian territory. Ba'athist forces were steadily losing cities and towns to rebel forces, and the survival of the Assad regime appeared increasingly uncertain. Under the advice of Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Russian military elites, Putin launched a full-scale military intervention of Syria to prevent the fall of their ally, Bashar al-Assad, and Syria's subsequent entry into the Western sphere of influence. Other objectives included showcasing Russian military prowess by guarding its naval port in Tartus and project Russia's expanding influence across West Asia, North Africa, Europe and Eastern Mediterranean. To avoid a repeat of the disastrous Invasion of Afghanistan, Russia implemented an irregular warfare strategy, sub-contracting ground operations to Syrian Armed Forces, allied foreign militias and Russian PMCs like Wagner. However, Russia would retain control over air operations. The Assad regime had lost vast swathes of territories by 2015, including the governates of Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Az Zor, Al-Hasakah, Deraa and Quneitra. Assad's forces had also been pushed out of the Hama, Damascus and Homs provinces by the Syrian opposition. According to Russian and Syrian officials, in July 2015, Assad made a formal request to Russia for air strikes combating international terrorism, while laying out Syria's military problems. According to media reports with reference to anonymous sources, after a series of major setbacks suffered by the Syrian government forces in the first half of 2015, Russia and Syria agreed to intensify Russian involvement. Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran's Quds Force visited Moscow in July to work out the details of the joint campaign (Soleimani's visit was denied by Russian officials). In August 2015, Russia began to send Russian-operated warplanes, T-90 tanks and artillery, as well as combat troops to an airbase near the port city of Latakia in Syria. On 26 August 2015, a treaty was signed between the two countries which permitted Russia to use Syria's Hmeimim airport free of charge, indefinitely. Ratified by Russia's parliament in October 2016, it also grants Russian personnel and their family members jurisdictional immunity and other privileges as envisaged by Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In September 2015, warships of Russia's Black Sea Fleet reached the eastern Mediterranean. At the end of September, a joint information centre in Baghdad was set up by Iran, Iraq, Russia and Syria to coordinate their operations against ISIL (in the newsmedia the centre is also referred to as "Joint Operations Room in Baghdad known as the 4 + 1" implying the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah, in addition to the 4 states). According to Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov's statement made in mid-October 2015, prior to the start of its operations in Syria, Russia invited the United States to join the Baghdad-based information center but received what he called an "unconstructive" response. According to Alexander Yakovenko, Ambassador of Russia to the United Kingdom, the Russian government received a similar rebuttal from the UK government. In late December 2015, Turkey's president Recep Erdogan said that he had declined Putin's offer to join this alliance as he "cannot sit alongside a president [Assad] whose legitimacy is distrustful[sic]." On 30 September 2015, the upper house of the Russian Federal Assembly, the Federation Council, unanimously granted Putin's request to deploy the Russian Air Force in Syria. On the same day, the Russian representative to the joint information centre arrived at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and requested that United States forces in the targeted area in Syria leave immediately. An hour later, Russian aircraft based in government-held territory launched airstrikes against opposition strongholds in Homs and Hama governorates. On the same day, Russian Orthodox Church officially praised the Federal Assembly's decision, depicting Putin's military intervention as a "holy war against terrorism". Before and after the operation in Syria, Russian analysts said that Russia's military build-up in Syria was aimed inter alia at ending the de facto political and diplomatic isolation that the West had imposed on Putin after his 2014 invasion of Ukraine. At the onset of Russian military intervention in September 2015, the Assad regime merely controlled about a quarter of Syrian territories and was widely perceived to be heading towards an imminent collapse.

Prevention of Qatar–Turkey pipeline

One of the drivers behind Russia's military involvement in defense of Assad's clan in Syria was preventing any gas supplies to Europe and Turkey that would compete with Russian supplies. In an October 2016 TV interview, General Leonid Ivashov said that Russia's engagement in the conflict would allow it to block proposed pipelines between the Middle East and Europe, and thus ensure the dominance of Gazprom. In 2024 after fall of Assad Russian journalist Irina Alksnis, writing for RIA, justified Russia's intervention nearly in the same words, listing "ruining Western plans of anti-Russian games in the energy sector" among the benefits.

Countering Revolutions

Another factor that motivated Putin to launch the intervention was his fear of massive protests within Russia. Putin accused the West of backing "color revolutions" to destabilize the region, and believed these revolutions could be replicated via a massive anti-government uprising in Russia, leading to his downfall. The downfall of the pro-Russian Gaddafi regime during the 2011 Libyan Revolution had deeply upset Putin. His apprehensions were further confirmed by the 2011-2013 Russian protests. In 2014, the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity ousted the pro-Russian regime of Viktor Yanukovich. Putin reacted by starting the Russo-Ukrainian War and annexing Crimea, a move which triggered massive international sanctions. In the face of deteriorating relations with the West and suspicious of another successful revolution in Syria, Putin intervened to prevent the collapse of the Assad regime.

Operations by Russian military forces

September–October 2015

The first series of air strikes took place on 30 September 2015 around the cities of Homs and Hama, targeting Syrian opposition forces. Russian warplanes attacked rebel positions "in al-Rastan, Talbiseh and Zafaraniya in Homs province; Al-Tilol al-Hmer in Quneitra province; Aydoun, a village on the outskirts of the town of Salamiyah; Deer Foul, between Hama and Homs; and the outskirts of Salamiyah". Most of the initial airstrikes targeted positions of the Chechen fighters, Islamic Front's Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), and Free Syrian Army. Ali Abdullah Ayoub, military chief of Ba'athist Syrian armed forces, portrayed Russian airstrikes as part of military operations against "terrorists", a term used in Ba'athist state propaganda to refer to all armed opposition groups. While Russian officials falsely claimed that the strikes were solely directed against IS bases, the location of bombings were in Homs and Hama provinces controlled by opposition militias fighting IS. Syrian civil society activists asserted that none of the strikes were against IS, but solely the rebel-held civilian areas, killing 36 civilians, including many children. US Secretary of State John Kerry denounced the targeting of opposition areas during a session with the UN Security Council. Defence Secretary Ash Carter denounced Russian attacks on opposition-held territories as "doomed to fail." Russia launched its military intervention with extensive air strikes across Syria, targeting the strongholds of Syrian opposition factions, such as the Free Syrian Army. Violations Documentation Centre (VCD) reported that more than 43 civilians, including nine children and seven women, were killed in Russian airstrikes in the central Homs region on September 30, the first day of Russian aerial bombings. VCD also documented the usage of two vacuum bombs and stated that the Russian warplanes mostly bombed civilian areas in villages and towns, including residential buildings and food distribution centres. According to Hezbollah media outlet Al Mayadeen, the Saudi/Turkish-backed Army of Conquest around Jisr ash-Shugour was bombed on 1 October by Russian planes; at least 30 airstrikes were carried out. Al-Mayadeen outlet also claimed that on same day, another series of Russian airstrikes targeted the Tabqa airbase, which was under the control of the Islamic State organization in the Raqqa region.

On 3 October, reports indicated that Hezbollah and Iranian fighters were preparing major ground offensives to be coordinated with Russian airstrikes. According to CNN, the Russian defense ministry said its soldiers bombed nine ISIL positions near the group's de facto capital in Raqqa. At least 11 were killed in a double strike by Russia in Syria's Idlib province, according to opposition groups.

On the morning of 7 October 2015, according to Russian officials, four warships from the Russian Navy's Caspian Flotilla launched 26 3M-14T cruise missiles from Kalibr-NK systems that hit 11 targets within Syrian territory. The missiles passed through Iranian and Iraqi airspace in order to reach their targets at a distance of well over about 1,500 kilometres (930 miles). The same day, Syrian ground forces were reported to carry out an offensive under Russian air cover. According to CNN citing unnamed United States military and intelligence officials, 4 of 26 cruise missiles on 8 October crashed in Iran, well before reaching their targets in Syria. Russia said all of its missiles hit their targets. Iran also denied any missiles had crashed on its territory. The Iranian defence ministry dismissed the CNN reports as Western "psychological warfare". On 8 October 2015, the number of air raids increased significantly up to over 60 sorties a day, a tempo maintained for the next two days. The Russian defense ministry announced on 9 October that up to sixty ISIL targets were hit in the previous 24 hours, killing 300 militants in the most intense strikes so far. One raid targeted a Liwa al-Haqq base in the Raqqa Governorate using KAB-500KR precision-guided bombs, in which reportedly two senior ISIL commanders and up to 200 militants were killed, despite the lack of any connection between al-Haqq and ISIL. Another destroyed a former prison near Aleppo used by ISIL as a base and munitions depot, killing scores of militants. Rebel training sites in the Latakia and Idlib provinces were reportedly hit as well. Meanwhile, ISIL militants made advances in the Aleppo area on 9 October, seizing several villages in what the Associated Press called a "lightning attack". The attacks were unencumbered by either Russian or United States-led coalition airstrikes. The ISIL advance came at the expense of rebel groups also targeted by Russian and Syrian forces. In mid-October 2015, a joint Russian-Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah offensive targeting rebels in Aleppo went ahead. According to pro-opposition citizen journalist group Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, Russia lied about targeting ISIL in the early airstrikes and missiles around Raqqa. Between 17 September and 13 October they counted 36 Russian strikes against only 2 ISIL targets (with 4 ISIL deaths) and 22 civilian targets (with 70 civilian deaths plus injuries) included hospitals, a fire hall, at least one school and a highway fueling station.

November 2015

On 17 November 2015, in the wake of the Russian jet crash over Sinai and the Paris attacks, according to the Russian defence minister's public report to the president of Russia Vladimir Putin, Russia employed the Russia-based Tu-160, Tu-95MSM, and Tu-22M3 long-range strategic bombers firing air-launched cruise missiles to hit what he said were the IS targets in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor as well as targets in the provinces of Aleppo and Idlib. The Russian minister of defence said that, pursuant to Putin's orders, the Russian aviation group - which, at the time, comprised more than 50 aircraft - begun further intensifying their campaign. In addition, Putin said he had issued orders for the cruiser Moskva that had been in the eastern Mediterranean since the start of the Russian operations to "work as with an ally", with the French naval group led by flagship Charles de Gaulle that had been on its way to the eastern Mediterranean since early November. The following day, according to the Russian Defence ministry, strikes by long-range bombers firing cruise missiles in the same areas in Syria continued. The mass cruise missile strikes carried out against ISIS in Deir Ezzor province on 20 November resulted in the death of more than 600 militants according to the ministry. A Russian Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraft was shot down by a Turkish Air Force F-16 on 24 November 2015. The pilot was shot and killed by Syrian rebels while descending by parachute, and the weapon systems officer was later rescued by Russian forces. A Russian marine was injured during the rescue operation and later died en route to a medical center. In the video the rebels shout "Allah Akbar" over the dead body of a Russian pilot. According to Turkey's statements presented to the UN Security Council, two planes, whose nationalities were unknown to them at the time, violated Turkish airspace over the Yayladağı province up to 2.19 km (1.36 mi) for 17 seconds. According to Turkey, the planes disregarded multiple warnings and were subsequently fired upon by Turkish F-16s patrolling the area. After the Turkish fire, one plane left Turkish airspace and the other crashed into Syrian territory. The Russian Ministry of Defense denied violating Turkey's airspace, stating they had been flying south of the Yayladağı province, providing two maps showing two different stated routes (one including turns and maneuvers described as "impossible"). Before the incident, Russian military jets had repeatedly violated Turkish airspace, causing political tension. A month before the shootdown, on 17 October, the Turkish prime minister warned that Turkey would not hesitate to shoot down airplanes violating its airspace. Russia responded by announcing the deployment of additional air defense weapons in the area and would provide its bombers with fighter jet escorts. On 26 November 2015, deployment of S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft systems was reported by Russia's official news media, to Latakia and on board the cruiser Moskva. At around the same time, Russia announced that it was preparing for more jet fighters and a new Russian combat brigade to be stationed at Shayrat Airbase in Homs once in service for aiding the Syrian government troops in their ongoing offensive against ISIL. On 29 November 2015, Russian aircraft were reported to have struck targets in the Syrian Idlib province, including the town of Ariha that had been captured by the Army of Conquest 6 months prior, causing multiple casualties on the ground. Other targets hit included the Turkistan Islamic Party's office in Jisr al-Shughur and a relief office of Ahrar ash-Sham group in the town of Saraqib.

December 2015 – February 2016

On 1 December 2015, The Times, citing local sources and news media, reported that Russia was preparing to expand its military operations in Syria by opening the al-Shayrat airbase near the city of Homs, already home to Russian attack helicopters and a team that had arrived about a month prior. On 8 December, the Russian defence minister announced that a Kilo-class submarine, Rostov-on-Don, had launched 3M14K cruise missiles while submerged, against ISIL targets in Raqqa Governorate, the first such strike from the Mediterranean Sea. He also reported to the president that pursuant to Putin's order, since 5 December the Russian military had intensified airstrikes in Syria: it was reported that over the three days, Russian aircraft, including Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, had performed over 300 sorties engaging over 600 targets of different type. On 11 December, in a televised meeting at the Defence ministry Vladimir Putin ordered the military in Syria to "act as tough as possible. Any target that poses a threat to Russian military grouping or ground infrastructure has to be destroyed immediately." He also appeared to suggest that the Russian military was now supporting the anti-government Free Syrian Army forces; however, the Kremlin spokesman later said that Russia was only supplying weapons to "the legitimate authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic". On 16 December, Russia's Defence minister Sergey Shoigu speaking to the members of the State Duma behind closed doors, mentioned a possible option of the Russian forces "reaching the Euphrates" in Syria. On 19 December, Putin commended the performance of the Russian armed forces in Syria; he said that "so far not all of our capabilities have been used" and that "more military means" might be employed there "if deemed necessary". On 21 December, the longest offensive of the year since Russian forces got involved yielded important gains. According to pro-government sources and social media accounts, these included the recapture of the strategic Khanasser–Ithriya Highway from ISIL and capture of the main rebel strongholds of Al-Hader and Khan Tuman, cutting the Aleppo–Damascus highway and leaving them in control of three-quarters of the southern Aleppo countryside. On 25 December 2015, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Sergey Rudskoy said that since 30 September 2015 Russian air force had conducted 5,240 sorties in Syria, including 145 sorties by long-range aviation. On 27 December 2015, Chief Commander of the Russian Aerospace Force Col. Gen. Viktor Bondarev stated that Russian pilots had not once attacked civilian targets in Syria. On 30 December 2015, heavy fighting was reported as the Syrian government forces backed by Russian air strikes advanced into the southern city of Al-Shaykh Maskin, which had been held by the rebel Southern Front since the First Battle of Al-Shaykh Maskin in December 2014. The Syrian government's offensive operation that began 28 December 2015 and concluded by the end of January 2016 was said to be their first major assault in southern Syria since Russia joined the fight. In early January 2016, regional diplomats who had assumed Moscow had an understanding with Jordan and Israel not to extend into their sphere of influence were reported to be surprised by the growing Russian role in Syria's south; so were rebels from Syria's Southern Front alliance whose forces were directly supplied by the Military Operations Command, an operations room staffed by Arab and Western military forces, including the US. On 9 January 2016, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that Russian air strikes in the northwestern town of Maarrat al-Nu'man had killed about 60 persons, including 23 members of the Nusra Front. In January 2016, the cruiser Varyag was deployed off Syria's shore replacing sister ship Moskva and was named flagship of the Russian naval task force positioned in the eastern Mediterranean. On 14 January 2016, the Russian defence ministry said that the first joint bombing mission had been performed by Russian air force Su-25 fighters and Syrian air force MiG-29 aircraft. Russia's role was said to be essential in the government's capture, on 24 January 2016, of the town of Rabia, the last major town held by rebels in western Latakia province. The capture of Rabia, part of the government's Latakia offensive, was said to threaten rebel supply lines from Turkey. At the end of January 2016, Russia, for the first time, deployed four Su-35S fighter jets, presumably equipped with the Khibiny electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems, to the Khmeimim base. On 1 February the Russian defence ministry said the aircraft had begun conducting missions in Syria. A Russian military adviser died in a Syrian hospital on 1 February after suffering severe wounds when a Syrian army training center in Homs Province was shelled. Speaking shortly after the formal start of the UN-mediated Geneva Syria peace talks on 1 February, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia would not stop its air strikes until Russia truly defeated "such terrorist organisations as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL″. In early February 2016, intensive Russian strikes contributed to the success of the Syrian army and its allies' offensive operation to the northwest of Aleppo that severed a major rebel supply line to Turkey.

March 2016 – mid-October 2016

On 1 March 2016, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that the truce, formally referred to as a "cessation of hostilities", that had been in effect from 27 February 2016 at 00:00 (Damascus time), was largely holding and becoming more stable. According to the state–run RIA Novosti's report of 1 March 2016, all the planes at the Russian Khmeimim base had been grounded for four days. On 1 March, the Russian defense ministry said it had deployed to the Khmeimim base additional radars and drones: three sets of surveillance equipment which included drones and two radar stations. On 14 March 2016, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that the mission which he had set for the Russian military in Syria was "on the whole accomplished" and ordered withdrawal of the "main part" of the Russian forces from Syria. The move was announced on the day when peace talks on Syria resumed in Geneva. The Russian leader, however, did not give a deadline for the completion of the withdrawal. He also said that both Russian military bases in Syria (naval base in Tartus and airbase in Khmeimim) will continue to operate in "routine mode", as the Russian servicemen there will be engaged in monitoring the ceasefire regime.

In mid-March 2016, intensive operations by the Russian forces resumed to support the Syrian government's bid to recapture the city of Tadmur that includes the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Palmyra, which were fully recaptured from ISIS on 27 March. Following the recapture of the city, Russian de-mining teams engaged in the clearing of mines planted by ISIS in the ancient site of Palmyra. In early May 2016, news media reported that Russian ground forces had set up what Jane's Information Group called a ″forward operating base″ (officially a base for the mining crews) just to the west of the city of Tadmur, and installed an air-defence system to protect the site. In mid-May 2016, Stratfor reported that a Russian air base was attacked and four Russian attack helicopters, 20 supply trucks and one Syrian Mig-25 were destroyed. However, United States media cited intelligence community sources as believing the destruction was caused by an accidental fuel tank explosion, that the Stratfor analysis was wrong and that there were no indications of an ISIS attack on the airport.

On 8 July 2016, a Syrian Mi-25 (a Russian Mi-35, according to other unofficial military sources) was destroyed on the ground from a United States-made BGM-71 TOW east of Palmyra, with two Russian pilots confirmed dead. On 1 August 2016, a Russian Mi-8AMTSh transport helicopter was shot down on its way back to the Khmeimim base from a humanitarian mission to Aleppo by ground fire over Jabhat Fateh al-Sham-controlled area in Idlib province. Three crew members and two officers from the Russian Reconciliation Center for Syria were killed in the crush, then their corpses were desecrated by the rebels arrived on the scene. On 16 August 2016, Russian Tu-22M bombers and Su-34 strike fighters began to use Iran's Hamedan Airbase for conducting raids over Syria. For a period of time, from late June until the end of the Summer Aleppo campaign on 11 September, Russian Aerospace Forces and the Russian naval infantry advisors were heavily involved in the various battles against the rebels and their allies throughout the campaign, according to pro-Assad sources. Russia's air force took active part in the Syrian government's re-newed Aleppo offensive that began in late September 2016, one of the consequences being the U.S. government in early October suspending talks on Syria with Russia. The Russian tactics and weapons used in the offensive have been compared to those used in Grozny against Chechen separatists. The U.S. government publicly stated that Russia was committing ″flagrant violations of international law″ in Syria and urged investigation of war crimes.

Mid-October 2016 – December 2016

On 15 October 2016, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov sailed from Kola Bay at the centre of a task group, which included the Kirov-class missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, a pair of Udaloy-class destroyers and other vessels, to deploy to the Mediterranean in support of Russian forces operating in Syria. Vzglyad, a media outlet loyal to the Kremlin, reported that the Russian government said there was a three-week partial hiatus in Russian airstrikes raids from 18 October. Admiral Kuznetsov's jets were reported to be flying off the Syrian coast on 8 November. On 14 November, a MiG-29K crashed en route back to the carrier following a planned mission over Syria, while an Su-33 crashed, again while trying to recover to Admiral Kuznetsov following a sortie on 5 December. Other ships as well as K-300P Bastion-P were also reported to have taken part in a renewed bombing campaign on 17 November. In late November, satellite images emerged showing several of Admiral Kuznetsov's fixed wing aircraft operating from Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia, with suggestions made that the number of sorties flown from the carrier was lower than had been claimed by the Russian Ministry of Defence. Problems with the ship's arrestor cables were cited as contributing to the crashed MiG-29K, which was circling the ship when it suffered an engine failure. At around the same time, an image was released by the Dutch frigate HNLMS De Ruyter showing the Nanuchka-class corvette Mirazh being towed back to the Black Sea. By mid-December 2016 the Syrian government, with the help of its allies including Russia, re-established control of Aleppo.

January 2017 – June 2017

On 1 January 2017, Russian and Turkish warplanes conducted joint airstrikes against ISIL as part of the Battle of al-Bab. On 6 January, the Russian Defense Ministry, with a reference to a Moscow/Ankara-brokered ceasefire effective 30 December 2016, announced the start of a drawdown of its forces from Syria, pursuant to a decision taken by President Putin. The first element scheduled to depart the region was announced to be the Admiral Kuznetsov battle group. However, five days afterwards, a Fox News report cited ″two U.S. officials″ as saying that additional attack aircraft had been deployed by Russia to its airbase in Syria, namely four Su-25 jets which arrived on 9 January. On 13 January, the Syrian Arab Army launched an offensive against ISIL in the Eastern Homs Governorate, intending to recapture Palmyra and its surrounding countryside. ISIL forces had retaken the city in a sudden counterattack. On 2 March 2017, the city of Palmyra was captured. On 5 March, a new offensive was launched which captured more than 230 square miles of territory around the city in a bid to expand the buffer zone around Palmyra. On 20 March, it was reported that Russia set up a training base in Afrin Canton to train YPG units in order to combat terrorism. There were conflicting reports about its location, with Reuters reporting it was in Jandairis and the pro-government Al Masdar News placing it in the village of Kafr Jannah. At various times, Afrin was the target of artillery shelling by Islamist rebel groups as well as by Turkey. In response, Russian troops reportedly stationed themselves in Afrin as part of an agreement to protect the YPG from further Turkish attacks. Russia scaled back its airstrikes in Syria in January and February, so that for the first time casualties due to US-led coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq began to exceed casualties of Russian strikes in Syria. However, strikes increased in March 2017, with a reported 114 incidents with 165–292 reported non-combatant deaths, primarily in Idlib province, Hama and the Damascus eastern suburbs. In response to the downing of a Syrian government Su-22 plane by a U.S. fighter jet near the town of Tabqa in Raqqa province on 18 June 2017, Russia announced that U.S.-led coalition warplanes flying west of the Euphrates would be tracked by Russian anti-aircraft forces in the sky and on the ground and treated as targets. Furthermore, the Russian military said they suspended the hotline with their U.S. counterparts based in Al Udeid. In the wake of the announcement, Australia suspended military flights in Syria, while media reports speculated that the U.S. might be edging towards a full-on confrontation with Russia and Iran in Syria. Nevertheless, on 27 June 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis reassured the press: ″We deconflict with the Russians; it is a very active deconfliction line. It is on several levels, from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of state with their counterparts in Moscow, General Gerasimov and Minister Lavrov. Then we've got a three-star deconfliction line that is out of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, out of the J5 there. Then we have battlefield deconfliction lines. One of them is three-star again, from our field commander in Baghdad, and one of them is from our CAOC, our Combined Air Operations Center, for real-time deconfliction.″

=== July 2017 – December 2017 === On 24 July, the Russian military announced that Russia had begun to deploy military police to Syria to monitor a cease-fire in two new safe (de-escalation) zones that had been envisaged in the plan on four safe zones, tentatively agreed upon by Russia, Iran, and Turkey in May, and mapped out in early July by Russia, the U.S, and Jordan. Checkpoints and monitoring posts around safe zones in southwest Syria and in Eastern Ghouta were said to have been set up. Another such deployment was effected in early August — north of the city of Homs. In August 2017, the Russian military announced that Al-Sukhnah town was captured from ISIS in early August with support of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Russian aviation said they had conducted 28,000 combat missions, and about 90,000 strikes as of late August 2017 during the operation in Syria. On 5 September 2017, the Russian defence ministry said that the breaking of the three-year siege of Deir ez-Zor had been effected with active participation of Russian aviation and navy. President Putin congratulated both President Bashar Assad and the Russian commanders on "a very important strategic victory" (in his spokesman's words). Humanitarian aid was delivered to pro-government inhabitants of the city by the Russian servicemen. The Russian aviation continued active support of the Syrian forces operating in Deir ez-Zor. The Russian military on 12 September said that 85 per cent of Syria's territory had been ″liberated from illegal armed formations″ and the operation would continue. On 16 September, the U.S.-led coalition officials said Russian warplanes had bombed U.S.-backed militants in Deir ez-Zor, U.S. Special Operations Forces advising the SDF being "at most a couple of miles" away from where the bomb struck; the statement was denied by the Russian defence ministry. According to the Russian defence ministry, the military police platoon (29 servicemen) deployed as part of the de-escalation observation forces in the Idlib de-escalation zone was on 19 September encircled by rebels, including Jabhat al-Nusra, as a result of their offensive against the Syrian troops positioned north and northeast of Hama. The encirclement was breached by Russian forces in a special operation leaving three servicemen of the Russian Special Operations Forces wounded. The Russian ministry stated that according to their intelligence, the rebels' ″offensive was initiated by the US special agencies in order to stop successful advance of the Syrian Arab Army to the east from Deir ez-Zor″. The Russian ministry's statement on the U.S.' role in the rebels' offensive was the following day endorsed by president Vladimir Putin's spokesman. On 21 September, the Russian MoD, in connection with what it called the U.S.-supported SDF having twice attacked positions of the Syrian Army in the Deir ez-Zor governorate with mortar and rocket fire, said: "Russia unequivocally told the commanders of U.S. forces in Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar) that it will not tolerate any shelling from the areas where the SDF are stationed. Fire from positions in regions [controlled by the SDF] will be suppressed by all means necessary." In early October, the Russian MoD continued to state that the U.S. forces were disguisedly supporting of the ISIL's attacks on Syrian government forces, especially from the area at Al-Tanf, and stated: "If the United States views such operations as unforeseen 'coincidences,' then the Russian air force in Syria is prepared to begin the complete destruction of all such 'coincidences' in the zones under their control." The MoD statement of 6 October referred to ″unlawful establishment by the U.S. of [Al-Tanf] military base″ and called it ″a 100-kilometre black hole" on the Syria-Jordan border. On 11 December, days after declaring Syria had been "completely liberated" from ISIL and with the campaign liberating the western bank of the Euphrates in its final days, Russian president Vladimir Putin visited the Russian base in Syria, where he announced that he had ordered the partial withdrawal of the forces deployed to Syria. Several hours later, Sergei Shoigu said the troops had already begun to return. On 26 December, defence minister Sergey Shoigu said that Russia had set about ″forming a permanent grouping" at the Tartus naval facility and the Hmeymim airbase, after president Putin approved the structure and the personnel strength of the Tartus and Hmeymim bases. On the same day, the upper chamber of parliament approved the ratification of an agreement between Russia and Syria on expanding the Tartus naval facility, which envisages turning it into a full-fledged naval base. At the end of December 2017, Sergei Shoigu claimed that the Russian military had eliminated several thousand "terrorists", while 48,000 Russian armed forces members had "gained combat experience" during the Russian operation in Syria.

January 2018 – August 2018

In January—February 2018, the Russian air force continued to provide combat support to the Syrian Army in its offensive operations in the Hama Governorate and the Idlib Governorate. The Russian forces stationed in Syria lost a Su-25SM in the Idlib province on 3 February 2018. Following reports about multiple Russian private contractor casualties in the U.S. air and artillery strike on pro-government forces near the town of Khasham in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate that occurred on 7 February 2018, the contingent of regular Russian forces stationed in Syria appeared to have been reinforced, though numerous witnesses of the strike dismissed the reports as untrue and did not confirm Russian mercenary participation. Namely, in mid-February, several Russian newest fifth generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighter aircraft were deployed to the Khmeimim air base in Syria; the deployment was interpreted by commentators as a possible response to the deployment of U.S. fifth-generation Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, which took part in the 7 February strike. In June and July 2018, Russian forces actively supported the Syrian Army in the successful execution of the Southern Syria offensive, which resulted in the Syrian government's complete control of Daraa and Quneitra provinces. In August, Russia began to set up observation posts in Quneitra, along the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone in the Golan Heights; plans for eight such Russian-manned posts were announced. By mid-August, four such military police-manned posts along the Bravo line were set up. At the end of August, the Russian media reported Russia was building up the largest ever naval grouping in eastern Mediterranean that included the cruiser Marshal Ustinov and all the three Admiral Grigorovich class frigates in service, including the latest Admiral Makarov. Speaking after talks with the Saudi Arabian foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir in Moscow on 29 August, Russia's foreign minister, in a reference to the Idlib rebel-held enclave, said, "[T]his festering abscess needs to be liquidated.″ Additionally, the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. published ambassador Anatoly Antonov's warning to the U.S. against ″yet another unprovoked and illegal aggression against Syria" on the pretext of a staged chemical attack. On 30 August, the Russian MoD said it would conduct large-scale drills in eastern Mediterranean that would involve 25 ships and 30 planes. The drills would take place from 1 September until 8 September and the area would be closed for other countries' vessels and aircraft. The announcement was made amidst reports of the impending Syrian government's offensive in the Idlib province and anticipated military reaction on the part of the U.S.

September 2018 – March 2019

On 17 September 2018, during multiple missile strikes by Israeli F-16 jets at targets in western Syria, Russia's Il-20 ELINT reconnaissance plane returning to Khmeimim Air Base, with 15 Russian servicemen on board, was inadvertently downed by a Syrian S-200 surface-to-air missile. Russia's defence minister the following day blamed Israel's military for the accident and re-affirmed its stance in a minute-by-minute report presented on 23 September. Early on 20 September, Russia's government-run news agency reported Russia had announced multiple areas of eastern Mediterranean ″near Syria, Lebanon, and Cyprus" shut for air and sea traffic until 26 September, due to the Russian Navy's drills in the area. Following the shoot down incident, Shoigu on 24 September said that within two weeks, the Syrian army would receive S-300 air-defense missile systems to strengthen Syria's combat air defence capabilities; a series of other military measures were announced such as radio-electronic jamming of "satellite navigation, onboard radars and communications systems used by military aircraft attacking targets in Syrian territory", in the areas of the Mediterranean off the Syrian coast. On 8 November, according to the Russian MOD, Russian special forces stationed at the Russian Reconciliation Center either directly participated or guided the Syrian Arab Army in a successful special operation which rescued all the 19 remaining hostages alive, held by ISIL north-east of Palmyra. Some reports stated the possibility of Russian special forces being covertly deployed in the province of al-Suwayda to support the Syrian Army advance on ISIS positions in the al-Safa area for the remainder of the offensive. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that 68,000 Russian army servicemen had so far taken part in the Syrian intervention by 3 January 2019. On 8 January 2019, Russian military units began patrolling areas in and around the vicinity of Manbij, including Arima. On 13 March 2019, the Russian defence ministry said its jets had bombed Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's targets in the city of Idlib, the operation having been cleared with Turkey. According to mass media reports, a displacement camp, as well as a prison were hit.

April 2019 – September 2019

Fighting intensified in Idlib and nearby areas at the end of April 2019, Syrian and Russian forces striking the rebel targets. On 13 June, the Russian military said fighting in the Idlib de-escalation zone had subsided as a result of a ceasefire agreement reached on Russia's initiative that came into force the day prior. By 10 July 2019, the government offensive in Idlib was judged to have reached a standstill, Russia's ties with Turkey cited as the main brake on any full-scale attempt to take the entire northwest. On 18 July, rebel commanders were cited by Reuters as saying that Russia had sent special forces to fight alongside Syrian army troops in northwestern Syria; Russia's defense ministry said these were false allegations. On 29 August, the warplanes of Assad regime and Russia killed seven civilians in attacks in northwestern Syria. The region had been under cease-fire. Officially, the campaign ended the next day on 30 August after a ceasefire was agreed upon by both the Syrian Arab Army and the rebels that would take effect on 31 August. Some skirmishes have taken place since September as fighting is still reported. Overall, it was a major advance in the Idlib deescalation zone for the Syrian Army after the complete liberation of Southern Idlib Governorate.

=== October 2019 === On 13 October 2019, Russian ground forces, along with the Syrian army entered and took the SDF-held areas on northeastern Syria following an agreement reached between the SDF and the Syrian government, shortly after Turkey commenced its cross-border incursion into the Kurdish-dominated region and the U.S. troops withdrew from the area. Russia's military police units began patrolling the town of Manbij.

November 2019 – September 2020

On 2 November 2019, Russian aviation struck a concentration of militants in the area of Jisr al-Shughur in the Idlib province. The massive bombing came two days after Bashar al-Assad issued an ultimatum to the militants in the area demanding that they leave or surrender. On 24 November 2019, the Syrian Arab Army, supported by Russian airstrikes, launched "phase one" of the offensive against the rebels' stronghold in the Idlib province, which was officially announced on 19 December following the collapse of ceasefire agreements. The Russian-supported Syrian government offensive successfully continued into 2020, achieving, among other objectives, the establishment of full government control of the area along the entire M5 highway for first time since 2012. Meanwhile, relations between Russia and Turkey, which was sending heavy armour and thousands of its regular troops to fight on the side of the rebels in a bid to stem the government offensive, strained significantly and direct Russian strikes on regular Turkish forces were reported, Turkey's president Erdogan announcing an imminent Turkish intervention in the area. On 20 February, Turkish defence minister Hulusi Akar told the news media there should be "no doubt" that Turkey would activate the S-400 missile systems it had bought from Russia in 2019. On 27 February 2020, according to reports from the scene, two Russian Su-34s conducted an airstrike on a Turkish military convoy killing at least 34 Turkish regular troops. Turkey did not officially blame Russia for the airstrike while Russia denied responsibility saying that the Syrian Air Force was likely behind the strike. According to Russia's defence ministry, Turkish service people "were in the battle formations of terrorist groups" when they came under the fire of Syrian troops. Meanwhile, Russia ratcheted up efforts through both official statements and state-sponsored mass media aiming to drive home the message that Turkey itself was to blame for its fatalities as Turkish forces were not supposed to be in Syria in the first place. On 2 March, according to Saily Sabah and TASS, Russian military announced that Russia's Military Police forces had been deployed to Saraqib following weeks of heavy fighting for control of this strategic town that saw it change hands several times; the declared objective was to secure safe passage of vehicles and civilians travelling along the M4 and M5 highways. On 15 March, Russian and Turkish forces started joint-patrols on the M4 highway as a part of a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Turkey. According to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Russian military forces will patrol the southern side while Turkey's military will patrol to the north of the highway. On 18 August, a Russian major general was killed and two servicemen were injured by a roadside bomb in Syria while en route to Hmeimim Air Base from Deir ez-Zor. In mid-September, Russian news media published officially unverified reports about "most powerful strikes" carried out on 15 September by Russian aviation as well as Iskander missiles against "terrorists", including Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, near the town of Maarrat Misrin.

Since October 2020

On 26 October 2020, the Russian airstrike on a training base run by Faylaq al-Sham, a major rebel group backed by Turkey, in the town of Kafr Takharim was reported to have killed at least 78 Turkish-backed militia fighters. On 19 April 2021, Russian warplanes executed airstrikes on militant facilities in central Syria, northeast the city of Palmyra according to the Russian Reconciliation Center in Syria. The Russian Defence Ministry claimed that some 200 militants along with 24 vehicles with weapons and 500 kilograms of ammunitions and explosives were destroyed in the operation without specifying the affiliation of the militants. The SOHR confirmed the airstrikes but stated that only 26 ISIS militants were killed in the region. In May 2021, Russia said that three Tu-22Ms became the first bombers deployed to the Khmeymim airbase in Syria with the aim of enhancing the stability in the region. On 17 May 2022, a Russian operated S-300 missile system is said to have fired a missile at a F-16 operated by the IAF. If confirmed it would be the first time Russian forces have fired on Israeli jets. It is also possible Russian forces have handed the missile system over to Syrian forces. In late May 2022, amid growing concerns of a new Turkish military incursion into northern Syria, Russia sent military reinforcements to Qamishli Airport. On 10 June 2022, Russia had conducted joint military exercises with the Syrian Army south of Idlib. Russia had also dispatched an additional eight military helicopters to Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase, south of Aleppo. During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia was reported to be withdrawing (since May) its troops from Syria as reinforcements to its dwindling forces in Ukraine; according to Moscow Times (16 September 2022), the re-deployment of Russia's last reserves in Syria is under way. During the year of 2022, the SOHR reported that at least 3,935 airstrikes were conducted by Russian forces in 2022 and that 159 ISIS militants were killed and another 255 were injured by Russian airstrikes on Islamic State positions throughout the country. As of summer 2023, Russia had 20 military bases in Syria as well as 85 other military points, the majority in Hama, Al-Hasakah, Latakia and Aleppo provinces. In March 2023, President Assad told Russian media that "increasing the number of Russian military bases in Syrian territory might be necessary in the future because Russia's presence in Syria is linked to the global balance of power."

=== 2024 Syrian opposition offensive === As of 2024, the Russian operational group in Syria consisted of special forces units, base security units, and part of an Air Force unit, maintained on a rotational basis. During the Northwestern Syrian offensive in 2024, the Russian Air Force renewed operations - conducting a number of airstrikes since the militants launched their offensive against Assad's forces in late November. The airstrikes were however limited and instead bombed civilian targets in the Idlib and Hama regions, specifically urban neighborhoods and refugee camps, including Morek, Khan Sheikhoun, Kanfranbel, Hazarin and Tal Kawkabah. At least 50 people are reported to have been killed by the airstrikes. On November 29 rebel forces had entered Aleppo. The day after several more settlements were seized, with the rebels entering Hama and Homs. On 7 December 2024, the outskirts of Damascus were reached by rebel forces. Following Damascus's seizure, Russia confirmed that Assad had left Syria and had stepped down. This was followed by an announcement by the Syrian army command to officers that the Assad regime had ended. Following the rapid disintegration of Syrian republic forces and the swift advance by the Syrian opposition forces, Russian airstrikes increased, but they were unable to stop any of the offensives. On 30 November, the Deir ez-Zor offensive conducted by opposition forces managed to consolidate a hold in the industrial zones of the city of Deir ez-Zor. Russian forces on the ground operating in the area were thus forced to coordinate a withdrawal of military equipment and personnel from multiple headquarters of the city, relocating these assets on the eastern bank of the Euphrates before pulling out all together the following day. On 1 December 2024, Russia conducted an airstrike on the University of Aleppo in Aleppo, Syria, killing 12 people and injuring 23 others. Two journalists were killed by the airstrike.

Fall of the Assad regime

Russian intervention ceased on 6 December after an airstrike failed to sever the key Homs-Hama 'Al-Rastan' bridge (merely damaging it) - opposition forces thus captured Homs with ease. Following this, Russia was unable to help Assad's forces any further, and their forces began evacuating its military fleet from bases in western Syria. The Russian embassy at Damascus was also in lockdown following the rebel capture of the city; Russia also ordered their citizens to flee the country. The two Russian bases in Syria had also been cut off creating a tense standoff - the airbase at Hmeimim airbase, and also the naval facility at Tartous. Russia vowed swift responses if these two were attacked, but Syrian opposition leaders have guaranteed the safety of the Russian bases as well as the diplomatic missions which have remained inside Syria. On 14 December 2024, Russian forces were withdrawing some of its forces from northern Syria and posts in the Alawite Mountains. They left in a convoy, heading towards the naval base at Tartous. In addition several large transport aircraft had arrived at Khmeimim air base, whilst helicopters and air defences were being disassembled. According to Syrian officials, Russia was not however pulling out of the bases and currently had no intention of doing so. On 24 January 2025, Syria terminated the investment agreement that granted Russia the operation of Tartous for 49 years. This meant that Russia would have to withdraw from the naval port at some point.

Assessments of tactics and effectiveness

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