Operation Blue Star

Operation Blue Star was a military operation by the Indian Armed Forces conducted between 1 and 10 June 1984, with the stated objective of removing Damdami Taksal leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and militants from the buildings of the Golden Temple, the holiest site of Sikhism, in Amritsar. The Shiromani Akali Dal political party and other Sikh factions had been based there during the course of the Dharam Yudh Morcha. The operation would mark the beginning of the Insurgency in Punjab, India. A long-standing movement advocating for greater political rights for the Sikh community had previously existed in the Indian state of Punjab, and in 1973, Sikh activists presented the Indian government with the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, a list of demands for greater autonomy for Punjab. The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. In July 1982, Harchand Singh Longowal, the president of the Sikh political party Shiromani Akali Dal, invited Bhindranwale to take up residence in the Golden Temple. On 1 June 1984, after abortive negotiations with the Akalis, the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi ordered the army to launch Operation Blue Star, attacking the Golden Temple and scores of other Sikh temples and sites across Punjab. Underestimating the firepower possessed by the Sikh militants, Indian forces unsuccessfully assaulted the Temple using light weaponry but quickly resorted to using heavy arms, including tanks, helicopters and artillery to dislodge the well-fortified Sikh militants. Combat devolved into protracted urban warfare, with the Indian forces committing significant forces to slowly gain ground. Eventually, the Sikh militants ran out of most of their ammunition on 6 June, and by 10 June fighting had largely ceased, with the Indian forces in control of the complex. Many civilians were subject to extrajudicial killings by the military during the operation. The military action in the temple complex was criticized by Sikhs worldwide, who interpreted it as an assault on the Sikh religion and the entire Sikh community, as well as the root cause for the subsequent insurgency, which would gain further impetus during Operation Woodrose. Five months after the operation, on 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated in an act of revenge by two Sikh bodyguards. Her party, the Indian National Congress, instigated and utilized public sentiment over Gandhi's death, leading to the ensuing 1984 anti-Sikh riots. Despite accomplishing its stated objectives, the operation has been described as "disastrous" for the Indian military and state. It greatly exacerbated tensions between the Indian government and the Sikh community, turning a series of police operations into widespread sectarian violence. The brutality of the operation and high civilian casualties spawned an insurgency in Punjab, which would be waged by Sikh militants for over a decade. The operation has been used as a case study highlighting the importance of respecting religious and cultural sensitivity prior to launching military operations. The complex would later be raided twice more as part of Operation Black Thunder I and II, with both operations having little to no civilian casualties or damage to the Temple despite larger amounts of militants than Operation Blue Star.

== Background == In the years leading up to the operation, there was a significant buildup in agitation for greater autonomy for the Sikh community. Economic and social pressures driven by the Green Revolution led many young Sikh men to support varying degrees of self-determination for Sikhs and Punjab, with many even advocating independence from India. The introduction of mechanised agricultural techniques led to uneven distribution of wealth in Punjab. Industrial development did not occur at the same pace of agricultural development in Punjab, as the Indian government was reluctant to set up heavy industries in Punjab due to its status as a high-risk border state with Pakistan. Meanwhile, a rapid increase in higher education opportunities without adequate rise in jobs resulted in an increase in unemployment among educated youth. The resulting unemployed young Sikhs were drawn to militant groups, which formed the backbone of increasing militancy. In the 1950s, the Akali Dal party launched the Punjabi Suba movement, demanding a new state within India with a majority of Punjabi speaking people, out of undivided East Punjab under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh. This movement resulted in fraught relations with the union government, and the Golden Temple, the holiest site in Sikhism, was raided in 1955, and many of the movement's leaders were arrested. In 1966, after negotiations, the present Punjab state with a Sikh majority was formed. The Akali Dal came to power in the new Punjab state in March 1967, but early governments didn't last long due to internal conflicts and power struggles within the party. Later, the party strengthened and party governments completed their full term and eventually came to play a major role in the developments to come.

After being routed in the 1972 Punjab election, the Akali Dal put forward the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 to demand more autonomy to Punjab. The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. Activist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale then joined the Akali Dal, and launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha movement in 1982, in a bid to urge the Indian government to implement the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.

Prelude

Following the events of the 1978 Sikh-Nirankari clashes and the Dharam Yudh Morcha, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale had risen to prominence in Sikh political circles with his policy of getting the Anandpur Resolution passed, failing which he wanted to declare a separate country of Khalistan as a homeland for Sikhs. The resolution declared its goals within the context of remaining within the federal union of India, and leaving the powers of foreign relations, defence, currency, and general communications subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian central government. Harchand Singh Longwal, the leader of the Akali Dal, stated "[let] us make it clear once and for all that the Sikhs have no designs to get away from India in any manner. What they simply want is that they should be allowed to live within India as Sikhs, free from all direct and indirect interference and tampering with their religious way of life. Undoubtedly, the Sikhs have the same nationality as other Indians." Nonetheless, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, viewed the Anandpur Sahib Resolution as a secessionist document. India was also aware of Pakistani influence and armament operations among the Sikh militants. According to anthropologist Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, Kashmiri fighters were present in the Golden Temple complex in 1984; both the Punjab and Kashmir insurgencies shared links with the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence whose aegis provided arms and training.

=== Guru Nanak Niwas === Following the 1978 clashes, Bhindranwale's followers had begun keeping firearms and fortified the gurdwara that served as the headquarters of the Damdami Taksal religious center. In July 1982, Harchand Singh Longowal invited Bhindranwale to take up residence in the Golden Temple complex. He called Bhindranwale "our stave to beat the government" for the Dharam Yudh Morcha. On 19 July 1982, Bhindranwale and approximately 200 armed militants resided in the Guru Nanak Niwas, a guest house for pilgrims, within the precincts of the Golden Temple complex. Bhindranwale had effectively made the complex his headquarters. From there he met and was interviewed by international television crews. For some months the Akali, Babbar, and Bhindranwale factions lived on the eastern end of the complex, close to the serais next to the offices of the SGPC, whose president Gurbachan Singh Tohra was charged with maintaining peace and minimizing the friction between the factions.

==== A.S. Atwal ==== On 25 April 1983, Punjab Police Deputy Inspector General A. S. Atwal was shot on the steps of the Darbar Sahib complex at point-blank range, then turned over by the assassins to ensure death, even as security guards stood just about 100 feet away. The assassination was never solved. The government promptly blamed militant groups, though all militant factions, as well as the Akalis, Bhindranwale, and the AISSF, all immediately and vehemently denied all accusations and unequivocally condemned the incident. Bhindranwale described it as being "the handiwork of the Government to malign Sikhs" and a pretext to raid the Golden Temple complex. Subsequent disclosures revealed that Atwal had in fact met with the Akalis and Bhindranwale for "secret" talks which would have potentially paved the way for a joint Akali-Congress government led by Parkash Singh Badal. To prevent this power-sharing arrangement, either militants who sought the full implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and revenge for police operations, or the Congress faction of the Chief Minister Darbara Singh, to prevent his imminent removal from his post by Indira Gandhi which the Akalis had been demanding, had both had motive to commit the act. Bhindranwale was not alone in suspecting government involvement. On the assassination, Longowal stated, "Whenever the situation becomes ripe for settlement, some violent incident takes place. I think there is a government conspiracy behind the DIG's murder." When asked who could be responsible, he implied Darbara Singh's involvement: "The one who is afraid of losing his seat (of power);" observers had noted that Darbara Singh had been on the verge of being replaced by the Congress high command, partly on Akali request and partly due to ineptitude. Bhindranwale condemned it as "the handiwork of the Punjab [Congress] government," and "an attempt to foil the Akali agitation and to malign the Sikhs." The president of the AISSF termed the shooting "anti-Sikh" and carried out by certain elements in the Congress party, demanding a judicial inquiry.

Akal Takht

On 15 December 1983, Bhindranwale was asked to move out of Guru Nanak Niwas house by members of the Babbar Khalsa, who opposed Bhindranwale, and which acted with Longowal's support. SGPC president Tohra would then acquiesce to permit the set up of his headquarters in Akal Takht (a shrine representing the temporal power of God) in the Golden Temple. The temple high priest protested this move as a sacrilege since no Guru or leader ever resided in the Akal Takht on the floor above Granth Sahib, but Tohra convinced the high priest to allow Bhindranwale to reside on the first floor of Akal Takht. As the Morcha continued, Akali protesters continued to fill jails as Sikhs faced increased surveillance and clashes throughout North India, and continued Akali-Congress talks failed to yield results, media reportage against Bhindranwale intensified, fueling demands from Parliament members of both houses for action against him. Despite this, Bhindranwale accused the media and the government of maligning him, the Inspector General of Punjab, P.S. Bhindar, personally selected by Indira Gandhi, issued a statement that there were no criminals hiding in the complex, and Rajiv Gandhi referred to Bhindranwale as simply a spiritual leader, with no arrest warrant of legal case against him, in March 1984. Bhindranwale and his men lived publicly in the open complex, granting interviews and attending rooftop sermons. Relations between Bhindranwale and Longowal began to weaken in April 1984, following the assassination of one of his gunmen, the responsibility of which the AISSF (which had been banned by the government in March in the course of the Morcha) laid firmly at the feet of Longowal, despite his denials. Longowal by now feared for his own safety. Morcha director Longowal was negotiating with Gandhi to grant some concession for which he could claim credit, so he could claim victory, end the protest, and isolate Bhindranwale. In an attempt to shore up continued support for his position as the director of the Morcha, Longowal convened a meeting of senior Sikh politicians, though 60 out of 140 would instead walk out to support Bhindranwale instead. While the government claimed that Bhindranwale and his followers had made the Golden Temple complex an armoury and headquarters, though amassing arms and usage as a base for waging war was part of the tradition of most historical gurdwaras, which display weapons caches used by the Gurus, depicting the centrality of Sikh sites to their struggles, and that neither British nor Indian officials had interfered with this tradition until 1983. A few leaders raised their voice against Bhindranwale in the Akal Takht complex and other gurdwaras across the state. Among the prominent ones was Giani Partap Singh, a spiritual leader and former Jathedar of the Akal Takht, who criticized Bhindranwale for keeping guns in the Akal Takht. Partap was later killed along with other dissenters including Harbans Singh Manchanda, the pro-Indira Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee president who opposed the Akali Morcha (whose killing was claimed by the Dashmesh Regiment, of unclear provenance if not a catch-all term of the media), Niranjan Singh, the Granthi of Gurudwara Toot Sahib, Granthi Jarnail Singh of Valtoha and Granthi Surat Singh of Majauli. The militants were able to claim safe haven in the complex due to the whole or partial support received by them from key Sikh religious leaders and institutions such as the SGPC, AISSF and Jathedar (head) of the Akal Takht. The support was either voluntary or forced by using violence or threat of violence.

== Negotiations == In January 1984, India's secret service Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) prepared a covert plan codenamed Operation Sundown involving special forces to abduct Bhindranwale from the Golden Temple complex. A RAW unit was formed to rehearse Operation Sundown in the Sarsawa Air Force Base in Uttar Pradesh, but the operation never materialized due to Indira Gandhi's rejection. The government sent a team led by Narasimha Rao to try to convince Bhindranwale to back out but he was adamant. The negotiations failed and the law and order situation in Punjab continued to deteriorate. Indira Gandhi tried to persuade the Akalis to support her in the arrest of Bhindranwale peacefully. These talks ended up being futile. In the days before the assault, government representatives met with Bhindranwale in a last ditch effort to negotiate a truce. The Sikhs would withdraw, believing they had seen a commando unit move into the city. Bhindranwale warned of a backlash by the Sikh community in the event of an armed assault on the Golden Temple. On 26 May, Tohra informed the government that he had failed to get Bhindranwale to agree to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and that Bhindranwale was no longer under anyone's control. Faced with imminent army action and with Harchand Singh Longowal abandoning him, Bhindranwale declared "This bird is alone. There are many hunters after it." Indira Gandhi then gave her permission to initiate Operation Blue Star on the recommendation of Army Chief Arun Shridhar Vaidya. She was apparently led to believe and had assumed that the operation would not involve any civilian casualties. The assumption was that when confronted Bhindranwale would surrender to the army.

Preparations

=== Fortification of Golden Temple === An arsenal had been created within the Akal Takht over a period of several months. It was reported that trucks engaged for kar seva (religious service) and bringing in supplies for the daily langar were smuggling in guns and ammunition. The police never attempted to check these vehicles entering the Golden Temple, on instructions from superiors. During a random check one such truck was stopped and many Sten guns and ammunition were found. The Indian government White Paper alleged that after Operation Blue Star it was found that the militants had set up a grenade manufacturing facility, and a workshop for the fabrication of Sten guns inside the Temple Complex. However, the allegations of the militants being in possession of weapon workshops was never made prior to Operation Blue Star, and only after, with only the Army making these statements. The statements of multiple civilian eyewitnesses instead were consistent that the militants were a small number of men and had limited arms that were used sparingly.

==== The Third Agency ==== A cover story in Surya magazine, published soon after the Army operation, quoted "highly placed and highly disillusioned sources in the Research and Analysis Wing," claiming that most of the arms inside the complex had been smuggled in under the supervision of the Third Agency, created out of the outfit and controlled directly by the director of the Prime Minister's secretariat, to justify an assault. One week before the operation, the Punjab Police had intercepted two truck loads of weapons and ammunition in the Batala sub-division of Gurdaspur district. But the Third Agency officer in charge of Amritsar persuaded the director general of police (DGP) to release them and ensure their passage to the Darbar Sahib complex. I.G. Bhinder, a personal friend of the Gandhi family, had informed the central government upon discovering that weapons being transferred into the complex, publicly confirming that the government had full knowledge of the weapons. According to former IPS and IAS officer Gurtej Singh, the weapons had been smuggled by Indira Gandhi's own Third Agency to be deposited into the complex; he himself had been approached by the government agency to be a possible smuggler in the summer of 1983. A brigadier posing as a Sikh, accompanied by a mutual acquaintance, had feigned concern that potentially facing an imminent army operation, Bhindranwale had no weapons, and had offered Gurtej Singh a truckload of weapons to take to the complex in a kar-sewa truck, which Gurtej Singh declined. Singh would later learn that the weapons were deposited by the acquaintance himself.

==== JS Aurora ==== When Lieutenant General J S Aurora had visited the Golden Temple with his wife in December 1983, while Bhindranwale was living in the Guru Nanak Niwas, and looked at various areas of the complex, he had noticed no defensive preparations anywhere. Visiting again on 24 February 1984, while Bhindranwale resided at the Akal Takht building, he only saw sandbags on the langar complex which "did not appear very formidable", which he was told was placed for protection after the CRPF had fired on the complex that month. He would visit again a month after the operation, attributing the professional defenses that had been built between March and June to Shabeg Singh who had served under him. After Blue Star, Aurora would debunk reports of large amounts of sophisticated weapons stockpiled in the complex, commenting on the lack of sophisticated weapons, mentioning a number of light machine guns and two rocket launchers, but the lack of medium machine guns or mortars, with the only weapons bearing foreign markings being 60 self-loading rifles. He would ascribe most of the weaponry to either simply having been picked up from misplaced weapons drops during border wars, issued by the government to people living close to the border for security purposes, government gun-running, or from Punjab's long-established rural trade of unaccounted guns, used in family feuds, property disputes, dacoit bands and the like. Describing the weaponry seized after the operation, he stated, "Quite a lot, yes, but the impression that has been built up in the public mind of foreign governments deliberately arming the terrorists with a view to overthrowing the government is grossly overdone." The Harmandir Sahib compound and some of the surrounding houses were fortified under the guidance of Major General Shabeg Singh, who had joined Bhindranwale's group after dismissal from the army. During their occupation of Akal Takht, Bhindranwale's group had begun fortifying the building. The Statesman reported that light machine guns and semi-automatic rifles were known to have been brought into the compound, and strategically placed to defend against an armed assault on the complex. Amidst claims of foreign involvement and the heavier weapons having Pakistani or Chinese markings on them, according to Aurora only 60 self-loading riles were foreign made. The rest were Indian. He also said that there were no medium machine guns and only two RPGs. Arora says that the arsenal was not truly sophisticated. A Lt. Colonel part of the Operation later revealed that militants only had 4 light machine gun magazines. According to him a single light machine gun carries 12 magazines. He revealed that the main gun that was kept and used by militants was AK-47s.

=== Presence of troops === According to Congress claims, holes were smashed through the marble walls of Akal takht to create gun positions. Walls were broken to allow entry points to the tiled courtyards. Secure machine gun nests were created. All of these positions were protected by sandbags and newly made brick walls. The windows and arches of Akal Takht were blocked with bricks and sandbags. Sandbags were placed on the turrets. Every strategically significant building of the temple complex, apart from the Harmandir Sahib in the center, had been fortified in a similar manner and allegedly defaced. The fortifications also included seventeen private houses in the residential area near the Temple. All the high rise buildings and towers near the temple complex were occupied. The militants manning these vantage points were in wireless contact with Shabeg Singh in Akal Takht. Under the military leadership of Major General Singh, ex-army veterans and deserters had trained Bhindranwale's men. The militants in the complex were anticipating an attack by government troops. The defences in the complex were created with the purpose of stalling an assault, giving time to provoke Sikhs in the villages and encourage them to march en masse towards the Golden Temple in support of the militants. Sufficient food to last a month was stocked in the complex. During this period police and security forces stationed around the temple complex were allowed only within 200 yards. This was to avoid the 'desecration' of the temple by their presence. The security forces were prevented by the politicians from taking action in enforcing the law. Even self-defence from the militants was made difficult. On 14 February 1984, a police post near the entrance of the Temple was attacked by a group of militants. Six fully armed policemen were captured and taken inside. After twenty four hours the police responded and sent in a senior police officer for negotiation. He asked Bhindranwale to release his men, along with their weapons. Bhindranwale agreed and delivered the dead body of one of the hostages who had been killed. Later the remaining five policemen were released alive, but their weapons were kept. The fortifications of the temple denied the army the possibility of commando operations. The buildings were close together and had labyrinthine passages all under the control of the militants. Militants in the temple premises had access to langars, food supplies, and water from the Sarovar (temple pond). Militants were well stocked with weapons and ammunition. Any siege under these circumstances would have been long and difficult. The option of laying down a long siege was ruled out by the army due to the "fear of uprisings in the countryside".

Intensification

Police methods normally used on common criminals were used on protesters during the Dharam Yudh Morcha, creating state repression affecting a very large segment of Punjab's population. This resulted in retaliatory violence from a section of the Sikh population and the widening the scope of the conflict, creating fresh motives for Sikh youth to turn to insurgency. The concept of Khalistan was still vague even while the complex was fortified under the influence of former Sikh army officials alienated by government actions who now advised Bhindranwale, Major General Shabeg Singh and retired Major General and Brigadier Mohinder Singh, and at that point the concept was still not directly connected with the movement he headed. In other parts of Punjab, a "state of chaos and repressive police methods" combined to create "a mood of overwhelming anger and resentment in the Sikh masses against the authorities," making Bhindranwale even more popular, and demands of independence gain currency, even amongst moderates and Sikh intellectuals. On 12 May 1984, Ramesh Chander, son of Lala Jagat Narain and editor of media house Hind Samachar group, was murdered by pro-Bhindranwale militants. In addition, seven editors and seven news hawkers and newsagents were killed in a planned attack on the freedom of media house, to cripple it financially. Punjab Police had to provide protection for the entire distribution staff. Violent incidents including arson, bombings, and shootings increased over the following months. The total number of deaths was 410 in violent incidents and riots, and 1,180 people were injured. On 30 May 1984, soon after Longowal had announced the Grain Roko Morcha to stop tax revenue and grain from leaving Punjab in protest, set for 3 June, Indira Gandhi had Zail Singh authorize military rule in Punjab. While he had reportedly remained unaware of the planned attack on the Darbar Sahib, some Akali leaders had known of the plan through secret communications with New Delhi. Tohra would inform G.S. Grewal, "I've come from meeting the Governor, I've told him it's not within our capacity to control Jarnail Singh now, if you want to do it, do it," though he and the other Akalis likely did not comprehend the nature and scale of the attack, as they barricaded themselves to save their lives in the complex for days during the operation.

==== Government claims ==== According to government figures released after the operation in the White Paper, the combined figure of Sant Nirankaris and Hindu deaths before the operation was 165. According to police records, over "fifty persons lost their lives or received serious injuries" in the period before the army action in Amritsar, including police informers and Hindus including Arya Samaj news editor Lala Jagat Narain, his son and successor Ramesh Chander, and BJP MLA Harbans Lal Khanna, There were claims of "killer squads", which had originated when the media had sensationalized Bhindranwale's calls for youth self-defense against the police during the Dharam Yudh Morcha. Almost all the murders remained unsolved, and the incidents were regularly denounced by "all segments of the Sikh religio-political spectrum." The government never provided evidence of the supposedly planned massacre of Hindus, which had been "the government's explanation for starting the operation," alleged by a single MP, that triggered Operation Blue Star, although the pace of attacks was increasing. Congress member of parliament Amarjit Kaur, who referred to the Akali Dal as "the enemy within" and who had opposed the creation of the Punjabi Suba, alleged that Bhindranwale wanted to start a civil war between the Hindus and Sikhs. Meanwhile, the number of killings had been rising all over the state, with sometimes more than a dozen a day. On 2 June in the last 24 hours before the announcement of the operation 23 people were killed. In June 1984, the army was called out to help the civil administration in Punjab in response to a request from the Punjab Governor, B. D. Pande, "in view of the escalating violence by terrorists in Punjab". Militants had already started the movement to drive Hindus out of certain areas to make way for Sikhs coming in from other states. Due to the increased incidents of religious violence, exchange of population had already started in Punjab. New Khalistani currency was being printed and distributed. By May 1984, the establishment of an independent Khalistan seemed imminent, as the Indian government had "received intelligence" that Pakistan had been supporting the militants with arms and money, and if Khalistan declared its independence there was the risk of Pakistan recognizing the new country and sending the Pakistani Army into Indian Punjab to protect it.

=== Army preparations === According to the then-Vice Chief of the Army Staff, S. K. Sinha the army had begun preparations for an attack on the Golden Temple 18 months prior. Two months prior to the Operation the Air Force had helicopters flying above the temple taking photographs. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) had surrounded the temple two months prior to the Operation. The facetious nature of the naming of the operation was revealed to Kirpal Dhillon, who would be appointed director general of police three weeks after the operation, by a semiretired major general who had held a key position in the army headquarters at the time, who had been discussing rumors of an army action (which had become common by early 1984) and its name with a junior deputy while passing by an advertisement for Blue Star air conditioners.

Operation

Operation Blue Star was launched to remove Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his followers who had sought cover in the Amritsar Harmandir Sahib Complex. On 3 June, a 36-hour curfew was imposed on the state of Punjab with all methods of communication and public travel suspended. The electricity supply was also interrupted, creating a total blackout and cutting off the state from the rest of the world. Complete media censorship was enforced. The army stormed Harmandir Sahib on the night of 5 June under the command of Major-General Kuldip Singh Brar. The forces had full control of Harmandir Sahib by the morning of 7 June. There were casualties among the army, civilians, and militants. Sikh leaders Bhindranwale and Shabeg Singh were killed in the operation.

=== Generals === The armed Sikhs within the Harmandir Sahib were led by Bhindranwale, former Maj. Gen. Shabeg Singh, and Amrik Singh, the President of the All India Sikh Students Federation from Damdami Taksal. General Arun Shridhar Vaidya was the Chief of the Indian Army. Lt. Gen. Krishaswamy Sundarji, GOC Western Command, planned and coordinated Operation Blue Star. From the Indian Army Maj. Gen. Kuldip Singh Brar had command of the operation. On 31 May he had been summoned from Meerut and asked to lead the operation to remove the militants from the temple. Brar was a Jat Sikh, the same caste as Bhindranwale, and was also acquainted with Shabeg Singh, having been his student at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun. Among the six generals leading the operation, four were Sikhs. The army operation was further subdivided along two subcategories:

Operation Metal: to take out the militants including Bhindranwale from the Golden Temple complex. Brar's 9 Infantry Division was deputed for this. Operation Shop: to attack extremist areas throughout the Punjab state and deal with remaining militants in the countryside. In addition, the army carried out Operation Woodrose, in which units were deployed to the border areas, replacing the pickets routinely held by the paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF). The border pickets were held in at least company strength.

=== 1 June === On 1 June 1984 the Indian security forces began the operation by firing into various buildings with the goal of assessing the training of the militants. Eyewitness testimony of pilgrims inside the temple complex state that the Harmandir Sahib was fired on initially by security forces on 1 June and not 5 June as reported by the army. The firing began at about 12:40 p.m. and went until about 8:40 p.m. It was by the C.R.P.F and they used M.M.G., L.M.G. and rifles. It resulted in the main shrine of the Harmandir Sahib sustaining 34 bullet marks. The action claimed the lives of eight pilgrims, including a woman and a child, inside the temple complex and injured 25 others. Devinder Singh Duggal, who was in-charge of the Sikh Reference Library located inside of the Golden Temple complex and an eye-witness to Operation Blue Star, stated that the militants were given instructions to not fire until the army or security forces entered the temple, in order to conserve their limited ammunition. Duggal stated "...when I heard in the news bulletin that there was unprovoked firing from inside the Temple, but that the security forces showed extreme restrain and did not fire a single shot, I was surprised at this naked lie." The deaths of at least three of the pilgrims was confirmed by the eyewitness testimony of a female Sikh student who had dressed their wounds and who later witnessed their deaths in Guru Nanak Nivas. According to Kirpal Singh eleven were killed in the firing. Furthermore, Duggal stated that on 2 June 1984 a team of the BBC, including Mark Tully, were taken around the Darbar Sahib and shown 34 holes, some of them as big as three inches in diameter, caused by the bullets on all sides of the temple. Mark Tully noted, "The C.R.P.F. firing took place four days before the army actually entered the Temple". The government waited as people entered the complex in large numbers in preparation for the June 3 commemoration of Guru Arjan's martyrdom; the army assault would not be launched in earnest until after the complex was at capacity.

=== 2 June === The army had already sealed the international border from Kashmir to Ganga Nagar, Rajasthan. At least seven divisions of troops were deployed in villages of Punjab. The soldiers began taking control of the city of Amritsar from the paramilitary. A young Sikh officer posing as a pilgrim was sent in to reconnoitre the temple. He spent an hour in the complex noting defensive preparations. Plans were made to clear vantage points occupied by militants outside the complex before the main assault. Patrols were also sent to study these locations. As the Indian army was sealing off exits out of Amritsar, it continued to allow pilgrims to enter the temple complex. All outgoing trains from Amritsar had left by noon and other trains were cancelled. The CRPF outside the temple had been replaced by the army who were taking into custody any visitors leaving the temple. A pilgrim who survived the assault stated that he did not leave the temple because of the detention of visitors by the army. By nightfall media and the press were gagged and rail, road and air services in Punjab were suspended. Foreigners and non-resident Indians were denied entry. General Gauri Shankar was appointed as security advisor to the Governor of Punjab. The water and electricity supply was cut off. There were no warnings to civilians nor plans to evacuate them to limit casualties; rather, shoot-on-sight commands had been given to the army, whose quarantine would stop all rail, road, and foot traffic in Punjab by the next day.

=== 3 June === According to an All Sikhs Student Federation member, 10,000 people had come from outside, including many women, with 4,000 of them young people. The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee estimates that approximately 10,000 to 15,000 pilgrims had come from Punjab's cities and villages to attend the Gurpurab. Along with the pilgrims were 1,300 Akali workers led by Jathedar Nachattar Singh who had come to participate in the Dharam Yudh Morcha and to court arrest. The Akali jathas who were also present consisted of about 200 women, 18 children and about 1,100 men and were also forced to stay inside the temple complex. Those who were inside were not allowed to go out after 10:00 pm on 3 June because of the curfew placed by the military. In addition, as of 3 June the pilgrims who had entered the temple in the days prior were unaware that Punjab had been placed under curfew. Thousands of pilgrims and hundreds of Akali workers had been allowed to collect inside the Temple complex without any warning either of the sudden curfew or imminent Army attack. In the night the curfew was re-imposed with the army and para-military patrolling all of Punjab. The army sealed off all routes of ingress and exit around the temple complex. Army units led by Indian Army Lt. Gen Kuldip Singh Brar surrounded the temple complex on 3 June 1984. Just before the commencement of the operation, Lt. Gen Brar addressed the soldiers:

The action is not against the Sikhs or the Sikh religion; it is against terrorism. If there is anyone amongst them, who have strong religious sentiments or other reservations, and do not wish to take part in the operation he can opt out, and it will not be held against him. However, no one opted out and that included many "Sikh officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks".

4 June

The accounts of survivors inside of the temple complex were consistent with the military commencing its assault in the early morning of June 4, which would continue until the 7th. The army began bombarding the historic Ramgarhia Bunga, the water tank, and other fortified positions with Ordnance QF 25-pounder artillery. After destroying the outer defences laid by Shabeg Singh, the army moved tanks and APCs onto the road separating the Guru Nanak Niwas building. The army helicopters spotted the massive movements, and General Krishnaswamy Sundarji sent tanks and APCs to meet them. Duggal states that the army attack started at 4:00 am with a 25-pounder that fell in the ramparts of the Deori to the left of the Akal Takht Sahib. Duggal further states that during the assault he saw a number of dead bodies of children and women in the Parikrama. The army's assault had prevented Duggal from leaving the room in which he had taken shelter as he believed it would have resulted in his death. Another eyewitness, Bhan Singh the Secretary of the SGPC, states that the army provided no warning of the start of the attack which prevented pilgrims and those who came as a part of the Dharam Yudh Morcha from exiting. A female survivor recalled that it was not until the army began using explosives on the temple that they were aware that it had commenced its assault. She further stated that within the Harmandir Sahib, there were some granthis (priests), ragis (singers), sevadars (service volunteers) and yatris (pilgrims) but no armed militants. Prithpal Singh, the sevadar on duty at the Akal rest house which housed pilgrims, stated that it was shelled by the military. As of May 1985 during the recording of Prithpal's account, the Akal Rest house still bore the bullet marks caused by the Indian Army.

==== Lack of civilian forewarning ==== On 4 June no warning was provided to the pilgrims to evacuate and the pilgrims were deterred of leaving as the Indian army would arrest anyone who left the temple complex. Although officially the army stated that it made announcements, the eyewitness testimony of pilgrims who were arrested after the assault was used as the basis of a decision in the Amritsar district court in April 2017 which held that the army made no such announcements. The eyewitness testimony of survivors of the army's assault on the temple complex were consistent with stating that they were unaware of the start of the attack by the army until it took place without notice on the morning of 4 June. In response to the claim that on 4 and 5 June, messages asking pilgrims to leave the temple were played over loudspeakers, in 2017 the Amritsar District and Sessions Judge Gurbir Singh gave a ruling which stated that there was no evidence that the Indian army provided warnings for pilgrims to leave the temple complex before commencing their assault. Judge Gurbir Singh wrote in his ruling, "There is no evidence that army made any announcements asking ordinary civilians to leave Golden Temple complex before launching the operation in 1984...There is no written record of any public announcement by the civil authorities requesting the people to come out of the complex. No log of vehicle used for making such announcements is there...The event underlines the human rights violations by troops during the operation. The lack of evidence of any warning to vacate the temple complex was the basis of a compensatory award of ₹400,000 rupees (approximately $6,150 in 2017 currency) given to 40 Sikhs in 2017, 33 years later, who had been illegally detained by the Indian military in Jodhpur, Rajasthan for four to five years, even after their discharge had been ordered by courts. According to Kirpal S. Dhillon, who would be appointed DGP of the state three weeks after the operation, it was clear that there were no escape routes for pilgrims amid chaos, except if army had taken help of akalis, who were also trapped in the complex, which they did not.

=== 5 June === Most civilian deaths would take place in the adjoining pilgrim rest houses, which would show no signs of direct shelling, corroborating civilian reports of close-range shooting massacres by the army. The hands of Sikh male pilgrims were tied by their own turbans as they were beaten and left for dead, or shot. Screams were heard from the rest houses by eyewitness accounts, as people were set alight in the rest houses. On 5 June, the blind head Ragi of the Harmandir Sahib Amrik Singh and Ragi Avtar Singh, were struck by bullets inside of the Harmandir Sahib by the Indian army. The army's targeting of the Harmandir Sahib with bullets was in contrast to the alleged restraint stated in the army issued White Paper on 10 July 1984. As of 5 June pilgrims who had reached the temple on 3 June were still present hiding in rooms. In one room 40–50 persons were huddled together including a six-month-old child during the army's assault. A female survivor of the assault stated that the army asked people to leave their hiding spots and guaranteed safe passage and water; she recalled seeing the dead bodies of pilgrims who answered the announcements lying in the Parikrama the next morning. In the morning, shelling started on the building inside the Harmandir Sahib complex. The 9th division launched a frontal attack on the Akal Takht, although it was unable to secure the building. The Golden Temple complex had honeycombed tunnel structures.

==== 7:00 pm ==== The BSF and CRPF attacked Hotel Temple View and Brahm Boota Akhara, respectively, on the southwest fringes of the complex. By 10:00 pm both the structures were under their control. The army simultaneously attacked various other gurdwaras. Sources mention either 42 or 74 locations.

==== 10:00 pm – 7:30 am ==== Late in the evening, the generals decided to launch a simultaneous attack from three sides. Ten Guards, 1 Para Commandos and Special Frontier Force (SFF) would attack from the main entrance of the complex, and 26 Madras and 9 Kumaon battalions from the hostel complex side entrance from the south. The objective of the 10 Guards was to secure the northern wing of the Temple complex and draw attention away from SFF who were to secure the western wing of the complex and 1 Para Commandos who were to gain a foothold in Akal Takht and in Harmandir Sahab, with the help of divers. 26 Madras was tasked with securing the southern and the eastern complexes, and the 9 Kumaon regiment with SGPC building and Guru Ramdas Serai. Twelve Bihar was charged with providing a cordon and fire support to the other regiments by neutralising enemy positions under their observance. An initial attempt by the commandos to gain a foothold at Darshani Deori failed as they came under devastating fire, after which several further attempts were made with varying degrees of success. Eventually, other teams managed to reach Darshani Deori, a building north of the Nishan Sahib, and started to fire at the Akal Takth and a red building towards its left, so that the SFF troops could get closer to the Darshani Deori and fire gas canisters at Akal Takth. The canisters bounced off the building and affected the troops instead. Meanwhile, 26 Madras and 9 Garhwal Rifles (reserve troops) had come under heavy fire from the Langar rooftop, Guru Ramdas Serai and the buildings in the vicinity. Moreover, they took a lot of time in forcing open the heavy Southern Gate, which had to be shot open with tank fire. This delay caused a lot of casualties among the Indian troops fighting inside the complex. Three tanks and an APC had entered the complex. Crawling was impossible as Shabeg Singh had placed light machine guns nine or ten inches above the ground. The attempt caused many casualties among the Indian troops. A third attempt to gain the Pool was made by a squad of 200 commandos. On the southern side, the Madras and Garhwal battalions were not able to make it to the pavement around the pool because they were engaged by positions on the southern side. Despite the mounting casualties, General Sunderji ordered a fourth assault by the commandos. This time, the Madras battalion was reinforced with two more companies of the 7th Garhwal Rifles under the command of General Kuldip Singh Brar. However, the Madras and Garhwal troops under Brigadier A. K. Dewan once again failed to move towards the parikarma (the pavement around the pool). Brigadier Dewan reported heavy casualties and requested more reinforcements. General Brar sent two companies of 15 Kumaon Regiment. This resulted in yet more heavy casualties, forcing Brigadier Dewan to request tank support. As one APC inched closer to the Akal Takht it was hit with an anti-tank RPG, which immediately immobilized it. Brar also requested tank support. The tanks received the clearance to fire their main guns (105 mm high-explosive squash head shells) only at around 7:30 am.

According to Giani Puran Singh, a priest in Harimander Sahib, at 10;00 pm tanks began entering the temple complex. At the same time armored carriers began entering to.

==== Popular uprising ==== During the course of the operation, army conduct towards civilians found in the offices and rest houses, who had been ordered to "surrender" on the night of 5 June, worsened as reports of a popular uprising of Sikhs across Punjab and India heading to defend the Darbar Sahib. Sikh villagers had begun to march to the site, grabbing whatever implements available, like staffs and sickles, to defend it. Many, including young and elderly, including women, were killed, as slogans in support of Sikhism and Bhindranwale was followed by machine gun fire and screams. According to Khushwant Singh, throngs of up to 20,000 were stopped by helicopters, tanks, and armored cars. Army commanders, considering time to be running out before a mass uprising, decided to escalate the operation to any extent to end the operation that night, when Akali leaders, including Longowal, Tohra, and others, would be taken into custody around 1 a.m. on 6 June, possibly by force from a room in the Teja Singh Samundri Hall, into an armoured personnel carrier.

6 June

The heavy artillery, reinforcements, and chemical weapons had not yet finished off the approximately 200 militants by 6 June; small groups of fighters, armed with mostly World War II-era guns, would continue to emerge from under the Akal Takht and engage with the army until death. Tanks would be driven onto the complex for the final assault. According to Maj. Gen. J. S. Jamwal, who commanded the 15th Infantry Division, as the assault got bogged down in the early hours, Brar began to panic, revealed in his voice when on the radio to the 10th Guards, "what should I do...get something done." He had apparently having "forgotten" of his reserves, two companies of the 9 Garhwal Rifles. When reminded of them, he then ordered them in, only then managing to reach an advantageous position. At 10:00 am the "vigorous" battle ended. In the battle about 40–50 Sikhs fought the army continuously until they died or ran out of ammunition. Once this battle ended the army gained control of Darshani Deori, Clock Tower, and Atta Mandi. Vijayanta tanks shelled the Akal Takht. It suffered some damage but the structure was still standing. The Special Group, a confidential special forces unit of the R&AW, began its planned raid on this day. Afterwards, the Indian military detained surviving pilgrims on the grounds that they were affiliated with the militants and subjected them to interrogations, beatings and executions.

=== 7–10 June === The battle ended at around 1 a.m. on 7 June. Few surviving snipers who had managed to hold off the army for 3 days were killed. The army entered the Akal Takht. Dead bodies of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, Shabeg Singh and Amrik Singh were discovered in the building, and taken by the army. Photographs smuggled out that year would include one of Shabeg Singh's body showing signs of likely post-capture torture, with a gouged eye and battered body. According to Giani Puran Singh a Granthi of the Golden Temple on June 7 at Ramgharia Bunga 4 Sikh held out at a trench they had dug. Giani Puran Singh was told by soldier to negotiate with them, but they pledged to die there. They killed multiple soldiers. The army failed to fight the Sikh so they attempted bombing them, but the Sikh still held out. They were eventually drawn out with chemical gas and were killed on June 10. President Zail Singh visited the temple premises after the operation, while making the round, he was shot at by a sniper from one of the buildings that the army had not yet cleared. The bullet hit the arm of an army colonel who led a Commando battalion. He was accompanying the president. On June 8, he was shot by the Sikh held out in Ramgharia Bunga. The Sikh held out were Major Singh Nagoke, Dalbir Singh, Swaran Singh Rode, Ram Singh Sultanpuri, and Nand Singh Patti.

==== Sikh Reference Library ==== Around noon on 7 June, the army burned down the Sikh Reference Library. The library contained numerous artifacts and hundreds of original manuscripts, including letters signed by the Sikh gurus. It had been intact on the night of 6 June, when Devinder Singh Duggal, its director, had left; he would be arrested a week later for refusing to sign a receipt relinquishing the building to the army. According to library staff, at least 13,000 books had vanished before the library was later set alight; the SGPC had corresponded with the central government for their return, as they were believed to be in possession of the Army, who was believed to have stuffed the books in more than 150 gunny bags and kept in Meerut. Much the remaining artifacts and racks bore bullet holes, and many paintings were incinerated or damaged beyond repair. Jamwal had ordered an anti-tank shell fired into the Akal Takht, which would instead be "misdirected" and hit the Sikh Reference Library, causing the fire. The shell would be one of 20 shells fired at the Akal Takht, some of which would miss and land behind the complex, hitting the army's own positions.

=== Mutinies by Sikh soldiers === According to Hamish Telford, "Operation Blue Star placed every Sikh soldier in a moral quandary: they were asked to submerge their cultural identity for the sake of professional duty." Cases of spontaneous mutinies by Sikh soldiers, mostly raw recruits, were reported from different places. From eight army cantonments far from Punjab, approximately 4,000 young men, generally without a plan had set upon main roads to apparently reach Amritsar, and were intercepted and mostly arrested, with some casualties. Most had not used the weapons that they had been well-trained with, though the mutinies would still create some panic in Delhi. On 7 June, six hundred soldiers of the 9th Battalion of the Sikh Regiment, almost the entire other ranks' strength, mutinied in Sri Ganganagar. The largest mutiny took place in Sikh Regimental Centre at Ramgarh in Bihar where recruits for the Sikh Regiment are trained. There, 1,461 soldiers—1,050 of them raw recruits, stormed the armoury, killing one officer and injuring two before they set out for Amritsar. The leaders of the mutiny divided the troops into two groups just outside of Banaras to avoid a rumoured roadblock. One half was engaged by army artillery at Shakteshgarh railway station; those who managed to escape were rounded up by 21st Mechanised Infantry Regiment. The other half engaged with the artillery and troops of 20th Infantry Brigade, during which 35 soldiers (both sides) were killed. There were five more smaller mutinies in different parts of India. In total 55 mutineers were killed and 2,606 were captured alive. The captured mutineers were court-martialed, despite efforts by various groups including retired Sikh officers to get them reinstated. In August 1985, 900 of the 2,606 mutineers were rehabilitated by the Central government as part of the Rajiv-Longowal accord.