Juan Perón

Juan Domingo Perón (UK: , US: , Spanish: [ˈxwan doˈmiŋɡo peˈɾon] ; 8 October 1895 – 1 July 1974) was an Argentine military officer and politician who was the 29th and 40th president of Argentina, serving from 1946 to his overthrow in 1955, and from 1973 until his death in 1974. He was the only Argentine president elected three times and holds the highest percentage of votes in clean elections. Perón was one of the most important, and controversial, Argentine politicians of the 20th century; his influence extends to today. Perón's ideas, policies and movement are known as Peronism, which continues to be a force in Argentine politics. In 1911, Perón entered military college, and rose through the ranks. In 1930, Perón supported the coup against President Hipólito Yrigoyen, a decision he regretted. Between 1939 and 1941, Perón served as a military attaché in Mussolini’s Italy. During this travel, Perón developed many of his ideas. Perón participated in the 1943 revolution and became Minister of Labor, then Minister of War and Vice President. He became known for adopting labor right reforms. Political disputes forced him to resign in October 1945 and he was arrested. On 17 October, workers gathered in the Plaza de Mayo to demand his release. Perón's surge in popularity helped him win the 1946 election. Perón's administration was influential for initiating industrialization, expanding social rights, and making university tuition-free. Alongside his wife, Eva Duarte (Evita), the government granted women the right to vote, built half a million houses, and provided charity, especially to children, and became immensely popular among the working class. It also employed controversial tactics: dissidents were fired from their jobs, arrested or exiled, and the press was controlled. Several high-profile Nazi war criminals found refuge in Argentina. Perón was re-elected by a landslide in 1951, though his second term (1952–55) was troubled. Eva died soon after his inauguration. Religious tolerance and charity given by Eva's foundation (historically provided by the church) damaged his standing with the Catholic Church. After an attempt to sanction a divorce law and deporting two priests, he was mistakenly thought to have been excommunicated, and pro-Church elements of the armed forces bombed Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires, in June 1955. 300 civilians were killed in this coup attempt, which prompted reprisals against churches by Perón supporters; a coup deposed him. During the following military dictatorships, the Peronist party was outlawed and Perón exiled. He lived in Paraguay, Venezuela, Panama and Spain. When the Peronist Héctor José Cámpora was elected president in 1973, Perón returned amidst the Ezeiza massacre and was himself elected president for a third time (October 1973–July 1974). Violence erupted between left- and right-wing Peronists, which Perón was unable to resolve. His minister José López Rega formed the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, believed to have committed hundreds of extrajudicial killings. Perón's third wife, Isabel Perón, was elected vice president on his ticket, and succeeded him upon his death in 1974. She was ousted in 1976, and followed by even deadlier repression under the junta of Jorge Rafael Videla. Although controversial figures, Juan and Eva Perón are considered icons by supporters. The Peróns' followers praise their efforts to eliminate poverty and dignify labour, while detractors consider them demagogues and dictators. The Peróns gave their name to the political movement known as Peronism, which is represented mainly by the Justicialist Party.

Childhood and youth

Juan Domingo Perón was born in Lobos, Buenos Aires Province, on 8 October 1895. He was the son of Juana Sosa Toledo and Mario Tomás Perón. The Perón branch of his family was originally Spanish, but settled in Spanish Sardinia, from which his great-grandfather emigrated in the 1830s; in later life Perón would publicly express his pride in his Sardinian roots. He also had Spanish, British, French and Tehuelche ancestry.

Perón's great-grandfather became a successful shoe merchant in Buenos Aires, and his grandfather was a prosperous physician; his death in 1889 left his widow nearly destitute, however, and Perón's father moved to then-rural Lobos, where he administered an estancia and met his future wife. The couple had their two sons out of wedlock and married in 1901. His father moved to the Patagonia region that year, where he later purchased a sheep ranch. Juan himself was sent away in 1904 to a boarding school in Buenos Aires directed by his paternal grandmother, where he received a strict Catholic upbringing. His father's undertaking ultimately failed, and he died in Buenos Aires in 1928. The youth entered the National Military College in 1911 at age 16 and graduated in 1913. He excelled less in his studies than in athletics, particularly boxing and fencing.

Army career

Perón began his military career in an infantry post in Paraná, Entre Ríos. He went on to command the post, and in this capacity mediated a prolonged labour conflict in 1920 at La Forestal, then a leading firm in forestry in Argentina. He earned instructor's credentials at the Superior War School, and in 1929 was appointed to the Army General Staff Headquarters. Perón married his first wife, Aurelia Tizón (Potota, as Perón fondly called her), on 5 January 1929. Perón was recruited by supporters of the director of the War Academy, General José Félix Uriburu, to collaborate in the latter's plans for a military coup against President Hipólito Yrigoyen of Argentina. Perón, who instead supported General Agustín Justo, was banished to a remote post in northwestern Argentina after Uriburu's successful coup in September 1930. Nevertheless, he was promoted to the rank of major the following year and named to the faculty at the Superior War School, where he taught military history and published a number of treatises on the subject. He served as military attaché in the Argentine Embassy in Chile from 1936 to 1938 and returned to his teaching post. His wife was diagnosed with uterine cancer that year and died on 10 September at age 36; the couple had no children. The Argentine War Ministry assigned Perón to study mountain warfare in the Italian Alps in 1939. He also attended the University of Turin for a semester and served as a military observer in countries across Europe – holding positions as a military attaché in Berlin and in Rome. He studied Benito Mussolini's Italian Fascism, Nazi Germany, and other European governments of the time, concluding in his summary, Apuntes de historia militar (Notes about military history, first published in 1932, 2nd ed., 1934), that social democracy could be a viable alternative to liberal democracy (which he viewed as a veiled plutocracy) or to totalitarian régimes (which he viewed as oppressive). He returned to Argentina in 1941, and served as an army skiing-instructor in Mendoza Province.

Military government of 1943–1946

In 1943 a coup d'état was led by General Arturo Rawson against Ramón Castillo, who had assumed the presidency a little less than a year earlier as the vice president of Roberto María Ortiz following Ortiz's resignation due to illness; both Ortiz and Castillo had been elected in the 1937 presidential election, which has been described as being among the most fraudulent in Argentine history. The military was opposed to Governor Robustiano Patrón Costas, Castillo's hand-picked successor, who was the principal landowner in Salta Province, as well as a main stockholder in its sugar industry. As a colonel, Perón took a significant part in the military coup by the GOU (United Officers' Group, a secret society) against the conservative civilian government of Castillo. At first an assistant to Secretary of War General Edelmiro Farrell, under the administration of General Pedro Ramírez, he later became the head of the then-insignificant Department of Labour. Perón's work in the Labour Department witnessed the passage of a broad range of progressive social reforms designed to improve working conditions, and led to an alliance with the socialist and syndicalist movements in the Argentine labour unions, which increased his power and influence in the military government. After the coup, socialists from the CGT-Nº1 labour union, through mercantile labour leader Ángel Borlenghi and railway union lawyer Juan Atilio Bramuglia, made contact with Perón and fellow GOU Colonel Domingo Mercante. They established an alliance to promote labour laws that had long been demanded by the workers' movement, to strengthen the unions, and to transform the Department of Labour into a more significant government office. Perón had the Department of Labour elevated to a cabinet-level secretariat in November 1943.

Following the devastating January 1944 San Juan earthquake, which claimed over 10,000 lives and leveled the Andes range city, Perón became nationally prominent in relief efforts. Junta leader Pedro Ramírez entrusted fundraising efforts to him, and Perón marshaled celebrities from Argentina's large film industry and other public figures. For months, a giant thermometer hung from the Buenos Aires Obelisk to track the fundraising. The effort's success and relief for earthquake victims earned Perón widespread public approval. At this time, he met a minor radio matinee star, Eva Duarte.

Following President Ramírez's January 1944 suspension of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers (against whom the new junta would declare war in March 1945), the GOU junta unseated him in favor of General Edelmiro Farrell. For contributing to his success, Perón was appointed vice president and Secretary of War, while retaining his Labour portfolio. As Minister of Labour, Perón established the INPS (the first national social insurance system in Argentina), settled industrial disputes in favour of labour unions (as long as their leaders pledged political allegiance to him), and introduced a wide range of social welfare benefits for unionised workers. Employers were forced to improve working conditions and to provide severance pay and accident compensation, the conditions under which workers could be dismissed were restricted, a system of labour courts to handle the grievances of workers was established, the working day was reduced in various industries, and paid holidays/vacations were generalised to the entire workforce. Perón also passed a law providing minimum wages, maximum hours and vacations for rural workers, froze rural rents, presided over a large increase in rural wages, and helped lumber, wine, sugar and migrant workers organize themselves. From 1943 to 1946, real wages grew by only 4%, but in 1945 Perón established two new institutions that would later increase wages: the "aguinaldo" (a bonus that provided each worker with a lump sum at the end of the year amounting to one-twelfth of the annual wage) and the National Institute of Compensation, which implemented a minimum wage and collected data on living standards, prices, and wages. Leveraging his authority on behalf of striking abattoir workers and the right to unionise, Perón became increasingly thought of as a presidential candidate. On 18 September 1945, he delivered an address billed as "from work to home and from home to work". The speech, prefaced by an excoriation of the conservative opposition, provoked an ovation by declaring that "we've passed social reforms to make the Argentine people proud to live where they live, once again." This move fed growing rivalries against Perón and on 9 October 1945, he was forced to resign by opponents within the armed forces. Arrested four days later, he was released due to mass demonstrations organised by the CGT and other supporters; 17 October was later commemorated as Loyalty Day. His paramour, Eva Duarte, became hugely popular after helping organize the demonstration; known as "Evita", she helped Perón gain support with labour and women's groups. She and Perón were married on 22 October.

First term (1946–1952)

Domestic policy

Perón's candidacy on the Labour Party ticket, announced the day after the 17 October 1945 mobilization, became a lightning rod that rallied an unusually diverse opposition against it. The majority of the centrist Radical Civic Union (UCR), the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and most of the conservative National Autonomist Party (in power during most of the 1874–1916 era) had already been forged into a fractious alliance in June by interests in the financial sector and the chamber of commerce, united solely by the goal of keeping Perón from the Casa Rosada. Organizing a massive kick-off rally in front of Congress on 8 December, the Democratic Union nominated José Tamborini and Enrique Mosca, two prominent UCR congressmen. The alliance failed to win over several prominent lawmakers, such as congressmen Ricardo Balbín and Arturo Frondizi and former Córdoba governor Amadeo Sabattini, all of whom opposed the Union's ties to conservative interests. In a bid to support their campaign, US Ambassador Spruille Braden published a white paper, otherwise known as the Blue Book accusing Perón, President Farrell and others of Fascist ties. Fluent in Spanish, Braden addressed Democratic Union rallies in person, but his move backfired when Perón summarized the election as a choice between "Perón or Braden". He also rallied further support by responding to the "Blue Book" with his own "Blue and White Book", which was a play on the Argentine flag colors, and focused on the antagonism of American imperialism. He persuaded the president to sign the nationalization of the Central Bank and the extension of mandatory Christmas bonuses, actions that contributed to his decisive victory. Perón and his running mate, Hortensio Quijano, leveraged popular support to victory over a Radical Civic Union-led opposition alliance by about 11% in the 24 February 1946 presidential elections.

When Perón became president on 4 June 1946, his two stated goals were social justice and economic independence. These two goals avoided Cold War entanglements related to choosing between capitalism and socialism, but he had no concrete means to achieve those goals. Perón instructed his economic advisers to develop a five-year plan with the goals of increasing workers' pay, achieving full employment, stimulating industrial growth to over 40% while diversifying the economy (then dominated by food processing), and greatly improving transportation, communication, energy and social infrastructure (in the private, as well as public, sectors). Perón's planning prominently included political considerations. Numerous military allies were fielded as candidates, notably Colonel Domingo Mercante who, when elected Governor of the paramount Province of Buenos Aires, became renowned for his housing program. Having brought him to power, the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) was given overwhelming support by the new administration, which introduced labour courts and filled its cabinet with labour union appointees, such as Juan Atilio Bramuglia (Foreign Ministry) and Ángel Borlenghi (Interior Ministry, which, in Argentina, oversees law enforcement). It also made room for amenable wealthy industrialists (Central Bank President Miguel Miranda) and socialists such as José Figuerola, a Spanish economist who had years earlier advised that nation's ill-fated regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera. Intervention on their behalf by Perón's appointees encouraged the CGT to call strikes in the face of employers reluctant to grant benefits or honor new labour legislation. Strike activity (with 500,000 working days lost in 1945) leapt to 2 million in 1946 and to over 3 million in 1947, helping wrest needed labour reforms, though permanently aligning large employers against the Peronists. Labour unions grew in ranks from around 500,000 to over 2 million by 1950, primarily in the CGT, which has since been Argentina's paramount labour union. Argentina's labour force numbered around 5 million people at the time and was the most unionized in South America.

During the first half of the 20th century, a widening gap had existed between the classes; Perón hoped to close it through the increase of wages and employment, making the nation more pluralistic and less reliant on foreign trade. Before taking office in 1946, President Perón took dramatic steps which he believed would result in a more economically independent Argentina, better insulated from events such as World War II. He thought there would be another international war. The reduced availability of imports and the war's beneficial effects on both the quantity and price of Argentine exports had combined to create a US$1.7 billion cumulative surplus during those years. In his first two years in office, Perón nationalized the Central Bank and paid off its billion-dollar debt to the Bank of England; nationalized the railways (mostly owned by British and French companies), merchant marine, universities, public utilities, public transport (then, mostly tramways); and, probably most significantly, created a single purchaser for the nation's mostly export-oriented grains and oilseeds, the Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI). The IAPI wrested control of Argentina's famed grain export sector from entrenched conglomerates such as Bunge y Born; but when commodity prices fell after 1948, it began shortchanging growers. IAPI profits were used to fund welfare projects, while internal demand was encouraged by large wage increases given to workers; average real wages rose by about 35% from 1945 to 1949, while during that same period, labour's share of national income rose from 40% to 49%. Access to healthcare was also made a universal right by the Workers' Bill of Rights enacted on 24 February 1947 (subsequently incorporated into the 1949 Constitution as Article 14-b), while social security was extended to virtually all members of the Argentine working class. From 1947 to 1950, the scope of security was extended (as noted by one study) “in the case of civil servants, aviation personnel, commercial and banking employees, the staff of private companies engaged in public services, soldiers, railwaymen and others, and set up a general non-contributory old-age pension scheme.” Various labor laws were also passed during the course of Perón's presidency. From 1946 to 1951, the number of Argentinians covered by social security more than tripled, so that in 1951 more than 5 million people (70% of the economically active population) were covered by social security. Health insurance also spread to new industries, including banking and metalworking. Between 1945 and 1949, real wages went up by 22%, fell between 1949 and 1952, and then increased again from 1953 to 1955, ending up at least 30% higher than in 1946. In proportional terms, wages rose from 41% of national income in 1946–48 to 49% in 1952–55. The boost in the real incomes of workers was encouraged by government policies such as the enforcement of minimum wage laws, controls on the prices of food and other basic consumption items and extending housing credits to workers.

=== Foreign policy and adversaries === Perón first articulated his foreign policy, the "Third Way", in 1949. This policy was developed to avoid the binary Cold War divisions and keep other world powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, as allies rather than enemies. He restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, severed since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and opened grain sales to the shortage-stricken Soviets. Perón's ability to effectively deal with points of contention abroad was hampered by his own mistrust of potential rivals, which harmed foreign relations with Juan Atilio Bramuglia's 1949 dismissal. The rising influence of American diplomat George F. Kennan, a staunch anti-communist and champion of containment, fed U.S. suspicions that Argentine goals of economic sovereignty and neutrality were Perón's disguise for a resurgence of communism in the Americas. The U.S. Congress took a dislike to Perón and his government. In 1948 they excluded Argentine exports from the Marshall Plan, the landmark Truman administration effort to combat communism and help rebuild war-torn European nations by offering U.S. aid. This contributed to Argentine financial crises after 1948 and, according to Perón biographer Joseph Page, "the Marshall Plan drove a final nail into the coffin that bore Perón's ambitions to transform Argentina into an industrial power". The policy deprived Argentina of potential agricultural markets in Western Europe to the benefit of Canadian exporters, for instance. As relations with the U.S. deteriorated, Perón made efforts to mitigate the misunderstandings, which were made easier after President Harry Truman replaced the hostile Braden with Ambassador George Messersmith. Perón negotiated the release of Argentinian assets in the U.S. in exchange for preferential treatment for U.S. goods, followed by Argentine ratification of the Act of Chapultepec, a centerpiece of Truman's Latin America policy. He even proposed the enlistment of Argentine troops into the Korean War in 1950 under UN auspices (a move retracted in the face of public opposition). Perón was opposed to borrowing from foreign credit markets, preferring to float bonds domestically. He refused to enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (precursor to the World Trade Organization) or the International Monetary Fund.

Believing that international sports created goodwill, however, Perón hosted the 1950 World Basketball Championship and the 1951 Pan American Games, both of which Argentine athletes won resoundingly. He also sponsored numerous notable athletes, including the five-time Formula 1 world champion, Juan Manuel Fangio, who, without this funding, would have most likely never competed in Europe. Perón's bid to host the 1956 Summer Olympics in Buenos Aires lost in the International Olympic Committee by one vote.

=== Growth and limitations === Economic success was short-lived. Following a lumbering recovery during 1933 to 1945, from 1946 to 1953 Argentina reaped the benefits of Perón's five-year plan. The GDP increased by over a fourth during that brief boom, about as much as it had during the previous decade. Using roughly half the US$1.7 billion in reserves inherited from wartime surpluses for nationalizations, economic development agencies devoted most of the other half to finance both public and private investments; the roughly 70% jump in domestic fixed investment was accounted for mostly by industrial growth in the private sector. All this much-needed activity exposed an intrinsic weakness in the plan: it subsidized growth which, in the short term, led to a wave of imports of the capital goods that local industry could not supply. Whereas the end of World War II had allowed Argentine exports to rise from US$700 million to US$1.6 billion, Perón's changes led to skyrocketing imports (from US$300 million to US$1.6 billion) and erased the surplus by 1948. Perón's bid for economic independence was further complicated by a number of inherited external factors. Great Britain owed Argentina over 150 million pounds Sterling (nearly US$650 million) for agricultural exports during the war. This debt was mostly in the form of Argentine Central Bank reserves which, per the 1933 Roca-Runciman Treaty, were deposited in the Bank of England. The money was useless to the Argentine government, because the treaty allowed Bank of England to hold the funds in trust, something British planners could not compromise on as a result of that country's debts accrued under the Lend-Lease Act. The country's need for U.S. made capital goods increased, though ongoing limits on the Central Bank's availability of hard currency hampered access to them. Argentina's pound sterling surpluses earned after 1946 (worth over US$200 million) were made convertible to dollars by a treaty negotiated by Central Bank President Miguel Miranda; but after a year, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee suspended the provision. Perón accepted the transfer of over 24,000 km (15,000 mi) of British-owned railways (over half the total in Argentina) in exchange for the debt in March 1948. Due to political disputes between Perón and the U.S. government (as well as pressure from the U.S. agricultural lobby through the Agricultural Act of 1949), Argentine foreign exchange earnings via its exports to the United States fell, turning a US$100 million surplus with the United States into a US$300 million deficit. The combined pressure practically devoured Argentina's liquid reserves and Miranda issued a temporary restriction on the outflow of dollars to U.S. banks. The nationalization of the Port of Buenos Aires and domestic and foreign-owned private cargo ships, as well as the purchase of others, nearly tripled the national merchant marine to 1.2 million tons' displacement, reducing the need for over US$100 million in shipping fees (then the largest source of Argentina's invisible balance deficit) and leading to the inauguration of the Río Santiago Shipyards at Ensenada (on line to the present day).

Exports fell sharply, to around US$1.1 billion during the 1949–54 era (a severe 1952 drought trimmed this to US$700 million), due in part to a deterioration in terms of trade of about a third. The Central Bank was forced to devalue the peso at an unprecedented rate: the peso lost about 70% of its value from early 1948 to early 1950, leading to a decline in imports fueling industrial growth and to recession. Short of central bank reserves, Perón was forced to borrow US$125 million from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to cover a number of private banks' debts to U.S. institutions, without which their insolvency would have become a central bank liability. Austerity and better harvests in 1950 helped finance a recovery in 1951; but inflation, having risen from 13% in 1948 to 31% in 1949, reached 50% in late 1951 before stabilizing, and a second, sharper recession soon followed. Workers' purchasing power, by 1952, had declined 20% from its 1948 high and GDP, having leapt by a fourth during Perón's first two years, saw zero growth from 1948 to 1952. After 1952, however, wages began rising in real terms once more. The growing frequency of strikes, increasingly directed against Perón as the economy slid into stagflation in late 1954, was dealt with through the expulsion of organizers from the CGT ranks. To consolidate his political grasp on the eve of colder economic winds, Perón called for broad constitutional reform in September. The elected convention (whose opposition members soon resigned) approved the wholesale replacement of the 1853 Constitution of Argentina with a new magna carta in March, explicitly guaranteeing social reforms; but also allowing the mass nationalization of natural resources and public services, as well as the re-election of the president.

=== Focus on infrastructure === Emphasizing an economic policy centerpiece dating from the 1920s, Perón made record investments in Argentina's infrastructure. Investing over US$100 million to modernize the railways (originally built on myriad incompatible gauges), he also nationalized a number of small, regional air carriers, forcing them into Aerolíneas Argentinas in 1950. The airline, equipped with 36 new DC-3 and DC-4 aircraft, was supplemented with a new international airport and a 22 km (14 mi) freeway into Buenos Aires. This freeway was followed by one between Rosario and Santa Fe.

Perón had mixed success in expanding the country's inadequate electric grid, which grew by only one fourth during his tenure. Argentina's installed hydroelectric capacity, however, leapt from 45 to 350 MW during his first term (to about a fifth of the total public grid). He promoted the fossil fuel industry by ordering these resources nationalized, inaugurating the Río Turbio coal mine, having natural gas flared by the state oil firm YPF captured, and establishing Gas del Estado. The 1949 completion of a gas pipeline between Comodoro Rivadavia and Buenos Aires was another significant accomplishment in this regard. The 1,700 km (1,060 mi) pipeline allowed natural gas production to rise quickly from 300,000 m3 to 15 million m3 daily, making the country self-sufficient in the critical energy staple; the pipeline was, at the time, the longest in the world. Propelled by an 80% increase in output at the state-owned energy firm YPF, oil production rose from 3.3 million m3 to over 4.8 million m3 during Perón's tenure; but since most manufacturing was powered by on-site generators and the number of motor vehicles grew by a third, the need for oil imports grew from 40% to half of the consumption, costing the national balance sheet over US$300 million a year (over a fifth of the import bill). Perón's government is remembered for its record social investments. He introduced a Ministry of Health to the cabinet; its first head, the neurologist Ramón Carrillo, oversaw the completion of over 4,200 healthcare facilities. Related works included construction of more than 1,000 kindergartens and over 8,000 schools, including several hundred technological, nursing and teachers' schools, among an array of other public investments. The new Minister of Public Works, General Juan Pistarini, oversaw the construction of 650,000 new public sector homes, as well as of the eponymous international airport, one of the largest in the world at the time. The reactivation of the dormant National Mortgage Bank spurred private-sector housing development: averaging over 8 units per 1,000 inhabitants (150,000 a year), the pace was, at the time, on par with that of the United States and one of the highest rates of residential construction in the world.

Perón modernized the Argentine Armed Forces, particularly its Air Force. Between 1947 and 1950, Argentina manufactured two advanced jet aircraft: Pulqui I (designed by the Argentine engineers Cardehilac, Morchio and Ricciardi with the French engineer Émile Dewoitine, condemned in France in absentia for collaborationism), and Pulqui II, designed by German engineer Kurt Tank. In the test flights, the planes were flown by Lieutenant Edmundo Osvaldo Weiss and Tank, reaching 1,000 km/h (620 mph) with the Pulqui II. Argentina continued testing the Pulqui II until 1959; in the tests, two pilots lost their lives. The Pulqui project opened the door to two successful Argentinian planes: the IA 58 Pucará and the IA 63 Pampa, manufactured at the Aircraft Factory of Córdoba. Perón announced in 1951 that the Huemul Project would produce nuclear fusion before any other country. The project was led by an Austrian, Ronald Richter, who had been recommended by Kurt Tank. Tank expected to power his aircraft with Richter's invention. Perón announced that energy produced by the fusion process would be delivered in milk-bottle sized containers. Richter announced success in 1951, but no proof was given. The next year, Perón appointed a scientific team to investigate Richter's activities. Reports by José Antonio Balseiro and Mario Báncora revealed that the project was a fraud. After that, the Huemul Project was transferred to the Centro Atómico Bariloche (CAB) of the new National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and to the physics institute of the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, later named Instituto Balseiro (IB). According to a recently aired History Channel documentary, the secrecy, Nazi connections, declassified US intelligence documents, and military infrastructure located around the remote facility all argue for the more likely objective of atomic bomb development. The Argentine navy actually bombed multiple buildings in 1955 – an unusual method of decommissioning a legitimate research facility.

Eva Perón's influence and contribution

Eva Perón was instrumental as a symbol of hope to the common labourer during the first five-year plan. When she died in 1952, the year of the presidential elections, the people felt they had lost an ally. Coming from humble origins, she was loathed by the elite but adored by the poor for her work with the sick, elderly, and orphans. It was due to her behind-the-scenes work that women's suffrage was granted in 1947 and a feminist wing of the 3rd party in Argentina was formed. Simultaneous to Perón's five-year plans, Eva supported a women's movement that concentrated on the rights of women, poor people, and disabled people. Although her role in the politics of Perón's first term remains disputed, Eva introduced social justice and equality into the national discourse. She stated, "It is not philanthropy, nor is it charity... It is not even social welfare; to me, it is strict justice... I do nothing but return to the poor what the rest of us owe them, because we had taken it away from them unjustly."

In 1948 she established the Eva Perón Foundation, which was perhaps the greatest contribution to her husband's social policy. Enjoying an annual budget of around US$50 million (nearly 1% of GDP at the time), the Foundation had 14,000 employees and founded hundreds of new schools, clinics, old-age homes and holiday facilities; it also distributed hundreds of thousands of household necessities, physicians' visits and scholarships, among other benefits. Among the best-known of the Foundation's many large construction projects are the Evita City development south of Buenos Aires (25,000 homes) and the "Republic of the Children", a theme park based on tales from the Brothers Grimm. Following Perón's 1955 ousting, twenty such construction projects were abandoned incomplete, and the foundation's US$290 million endowment was liquidated.

The portion of the five-year plans which argued for full employment, public healthcare and housing, labour benefits, and raises were a result of Eva's influence on the policymaking of Perón in his first term, as historians note that initially he simply wanted to keep imperialists out of Argentina and create effective businesses. The humanitarian relief efforts embedded in the five-year plan were Eva's creation, which endeared the Peronist movement to the working-class people from which Eva had come. Her strong ties to the poor and her position as Perón's wife brought credibility to his promises during his first presidential term and ushered in a new wave of supporters. The first lady's willingness to replace the ailing Hortensio Quijano as Perón's running mate for the 1951 campaign was defeated by her own frail health and by military opposition. A 22 August rally organized for her by the CGT on Buenos Aires' wide Nueve de Julio Avenue failed to turn the tide. On 28 September, elements in the Argentine Army led by General Benjamín Andrés Menéndez attempted a coup against Perón. Although unsuccessful, the mutiny marked the end of the first lady's political hopes. She died the following July.

== Opposition and repression == The first to vocally oppose Perón's rule were the Argentine intelligentsia and the middle-class. University students and professors were seen as particularly troublesome. Perón fired over 2000 university professors and faculty members from all major public education institutions. These included Nobel laureate Bernardo Houssay, a physiologist, University of La Plata physicist Rafael Grinfeld, painter Emilio Pettoruti, art scholars Pío Collivadino and Jorge Romero Brest, and noted author Jorge Luis Borges who was "promoted" from his position at the Miguel Cané Library to the post of "poultry inspector" at the Buenos Aires Municipal Wholesale Market (a post he refused). Many left the country and migrated to Mexico, United States or Europe. The theologian Herold B. Weiss recalls events in the universities:

As a young student in Buenos Aires in the early 1950s, I well remember the graffiti found on many an empty wall all over town: "Build the Fatherland. Kill a Student" (Haga patria, mate a un estudiante). Perón opposed the universities, which questioned his methods and his goals. A well-remembered slogan was, Alpargatas sí, libros no ("Shoes? Yes! Books? No!") ... Universities were "intervened". In some a peronista mediocrity was appointed rector. Others were closed for years. The labour movement that had brought Perón to power was not exempt from the iron fist. In the 1946 elections for the post of Secretary General of the CGT resulted in telephone workers' union leader Luis Gay's victory over Perón's nominee, former retail workers' leader Ángel Borlenghi – both central figures in Perón's famed 17 October comeback. The president had Luis Gay expelled from the CGT three months later, and replaced him with José Espejo, a little-known rank-and-filer who was close to the first lady.

The meat-packers' union leader, Cipriano Reyes, turned against Perón when he replaced the Labour Party with the Peronist Party in 1947. Organizing a strike in protest, Reyes was arrested on the charge of plotting against the lives of the president and first lady; according to Time, Reyes was contacted by two police officers posing as disloyal airforce lieutenants who convinced him of the existence of an organised conspiracy to overthrow Perón in the air force, which Reyes agreed to support. Tortured in prison, Reyes was denied parole five years later, and freed only after the regime's 1955 downfall. Cipriano Reyes was one of hundreds of Perón's opponents held at Buenos Aires' Ramos Mejía General Hospital, one of whose basements was converted into a police detention center where torture became routine. The populist leader was intolerant of both left-wing and conservative opposition. Though he used violence, Perón preferred to deprive the opposition of their access to media. Interior Minister Borlenghi administered El Laborista, the leading official news daily. Carlos Aloe, a personal friend of Evita's, oversaw an array of leisure magazines published by Editorial Haynes, which the Peronist Party bought a majority stake in. Through the Secretary of the Media, Raúl Apold, socialist dailies such as La Vanguardia or Democracia, and conservative ones such as La Prensa or La Razón, were simply closed or expropriated in favor of the CGT or ALEA, the regime's new state media company. Intimidation of the press increased: between 1943 and 1946, 110 publications were closed down; others such as La Nación and Roberto Noble's Clarín became more cautious and self-censoring. Perón appeared more threatened by dissident artists than by opposition political figures (though UCR leader Ricardo Balbín spent most of 1950 in jail). Numerous prominent cultural and intellectual figures were imprisoned (publisher and critic Victoria Ocampo, for one) or forced into exile, among them comedian Niní Marshall, film maker Luis Saslavsky, pianist Osvaldo Pugliese and actress Libertad Lamarque, victim of a rivalry with Eva Perón.

== Fascist influence == The relationship between Perón, Peronism, and fascism has been widely discussed. Historian Federico Finchelstein writes: "If the question is asked if Perón was a fascist, the answer is no. But, did fascism play an important role in the ideological genesis of Peronism? Although Fascism was a central genealogy of Peronism, Perón's coming to power signaled a break from diverse traditional precedents, including fascist nacionalismo. However, the ideological continuities between Argentine fascism and Italian fascism are notable in Perón's military junta between 1943 and 1946 and the first Peronist regime (1946–1955)." The core differences that Finchelstein noted between Peronism and fascism were: "While fascism mobilized the middle classes, Peronism rallied the working class. While fascism gave war, imperialism, and racism to Europe and the world, Peronism never provoked war." He also argued that "In contrast to fascism, which used democracy to destroy itself and establish a dictatorship, Peronism originated in a military dictatorship, but established a populist authoritarian democracy. Fascism sustained itself in the ideal of violence and war as sublime values of nationality and the leader's persona. In military terms, it mobilized the masses but tended to demobilize them in social terms. Peronism inverted the terms of the fascist equation." Assessments of Peronism as a fascist movement emerged during the 1946 Argentine general election amongst political opposition to Perón. Richard Gillespie writes:

Under the influence of European Social Democracy, Soviet Stalinism, and Argentine Liberalism, both parties [i.e. the Argentine Socialist and Communist parties], once the Nazis had invaded the USSR, characterized the Second World War as one between democracy and Fascism; then faced with the authoritarian methods of the 1943-6 regime and its refusal to enter the Allied camp until the Axis powers were doomed, Peronism, in part an offshoot of that regime, came to be branded by the traditional left as a fascist movement. This was despite the fact that Perón as Labour Secretary, had bestowed unquestionable material favour upon the growing working class .... Under these circumstances for the left to dismiss Perôn's supporters; including the mass of the workers as peronazis was not only unjust but also politically suicidal. Carlos Fayt states that Peronism was just "an Argentine implementation of Italian fascism". Paul M. Hayes similarly concludes that "the Peronist movement produced a form of fascism that was distinctively Latin American". Instead, Felipe Pigna believes that no researcher who has deeply studied Perón should consider him a fascist. Pigna argues that Perón was only a pragmatist who took useful elements from all modern ideologies of the time; this included not only fascism but also the New Deal policies of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. To Pigna, Perón was neither fascist nor anti-fascist but simply a realist; the active intervention of the working class in politics, as he saw in those countries, was a "definitive phenomenon". Summarizing the academic consensus on Peronism, Arnd Schneider wrote that "most authors, analysing the phenomenon in retrospect agree that the term Fascism does not accurately describe Peronism." Among others, scholars who argue that Peronism was neither fascist nor fascist-aligned include the historian Federico Finchelstein, philosopher Donald C. Hodges, and historian Daniel James. Argentine historian Cristian Buchrucker outlines main reasons why Peronism cannot be characterized fascist:

Peronism developed in the early and mid 1940s during a period of economic growth - unlike Italian Fascism and German Nazism, which developed at a time of economic crisis; when Perón became Labour Secretary in 1943 and started to implement the first elements of his ideology, it did not mark the end of democracy (as in 1922's Italy and 1933's Germany). Rather, Perón succeeded the Infamous Decade, which had already seen prolonged military rule and authoritarian conservative governments, "thinly legitimized by fraudulent elections"; Peronism was based primarily on the urban and urbanized rural working class. In contrast, the appeal of Italian Fascism and German Nazism was to the middle classes who were disillusioned with a lost World War I and economic crisis; while the societies of Italy, Germany and Argentina all perceived a threat of communism, only Italy and Germany had strong left-wing movements; Argentina lacked a strong left-wing movement, as socialist parties "had long been suppressed and ceased to play any tangible role", and "the working class, and the new urban poor, were without a real organizational voice" before Perón; the virulent, fascist territorial expansionism of Italy and Germany was absent in Peronism; unlike fascism, Peronism was an authoritarian, not a totalitarian political system, as Argentina never became a one-party state. Goran Petrovic Lotina and Théo Aiolfi wrote that "Peronism was never a form of fascism during Juan Perón's first presidencies (1946–1955). Nor was Peronism fascistic in its subsequent incarnations over the past seventy-five years from the 1970s revolutionary leftist Montonero guerilla organization to the neoliberal centre-right presidency of Carlos Menem." Hodges remarked that it is a "cheap academic trick to lump together fascism (...) and Peronism". According to Hodges, Perón embraced the concept of the state as the juridical instrument that can only function within and serve the nation, but rejected the organic notions of the state assuming the dominating role by organizing the nation. Perón also prided himself in his doctrinal flexibility and elasticity, and agreed with national syndicalism of Primo de Rivera in principle, although he ultimately pursued a different political path. Hodges argues that "In view of both its gradualism and its concern for striking a balance between extremes, justicialism has more in common with the American New Deal than with either Italian fascism or German national socialism." Daniel James believes that the neo-corporatism of Peronism cannot be explained by any allegiance to fascist ideas, arguing that Perón "took his ideas principally from social catholic, communitarian ideologues rather than from any pre-1955 fascistic theory." As a response to Carlos Fayt who characterized Perónism as fascist, James P. Brennan wrote:

A close study of Peronist ideology, however, shows that the differences between it and fascism are greater than their few similarities. The central components of Justicialismo — that is, of Peronist ideology — have roots in the Social Christianism and national populism of the FORJA (the yrigoyenista, the nationalist youth wing of the Radical Party in the 1930s), and in syndicalism. Moreover, this synthesis proved to be more resilient over time than many had assumed. In Peronism's formative stage, the irrational vitalisme ("life" philosophy) and Social Darwinism of fascism had minimal and no influence, respectively. With regard to Italian corporatism, which ended up replacing the unions and democratic elections, it cannot be seriously compared with the syndicalist element in Peronism. Peronism's presumedly expansionist goals likewise are nowhere in evidence, and Sebreli's thesis does not stand up to the slightest analysis. The only similarity that can be acknowledged is the particular importance both ideologies granted to the concept of the leader. [...]

Whereas Italian fascism and German nazism destroyed the universal suffrage that had existed in those countries, Peronism on the other hand put an end to the systematic electoral fraud that had been practiced in Argentina between 1932 and 1943. There was no militarization of society, nor was public spending directed toward a massive arms buildup. Economic policy was dirigiste, but if state planning is an indicator of fascism, one would have to conclude that Mexico under Cardenas and Great Britain under the Labour governments. The Peronist governments of 1946-1955 and 1973-1976 directed their efforts toward distributive and industrializing policies. According to Pablo Bradbury, while there was a great divergence between formal Peronist ideology and the wider Peronist movement, the ideology of Perón was not fascist; Bradbury argues that nationalism of Peronism was not rooted in a sense of expansion or imperialist greatness, but was left-wing nationalism that "found its most prominent expressions in anti-imperialism, whether against British economic dominance or US political interference." He also remarked that "Peronism originated in a military dictatorship, but established a populist authoritarian democracy". The democratizing movement within Peronism was significant, as it empowered previously marginalized groups – Peronism introduced universal suffrage and reshaped the definition of Argentinian citizenship and national identity. Bradbury also points to the racist rhetoric of middle-class and upper-class opponents of Peronism, who called Peronists cabecitas negras ("little black heads"), portraying the Peronist masses as prone to criminality, unsophisticated, dark-skinned and of immigrant background. Michael Goebel likewise points to the inclusive character of Peronism that conflicted with the exclusive nature of fascism – non-Spanish surnames were far more prevalent amongst the Peronist leadership than among any other political movement in Argentina, and "even in the more marginal provinces, Peronist politicians often had rather recent immigrant origins." Cas Mudde stated that "it is not an exaggeration to state that [Perón's] populism in general propelled democracy forward, both by encouraging democratic behavior and by enrolling lower class groups and their quest for social justice in political life." In 1938, Perón was sent on a diplomatic mission to Europe. During this time, he became enamoured of the Italian fascist model. Perón's admiration for Benito Mussolini is well documented. He credited both Italian fascism and German national socialism for creating a command economy that "harmonized the interests of workers", and his exact words in that respect were as follows:

From Germany I went back to Italy and studied the matter. My knowledge of Italian enabled me, I would say, to penetrate deeply into the foundations of the system, and that is how I discovered something which from that social point of view was very interesting to me. Italian fascism brought the popular organisations into effective participation in national life, from which the people had always been excluded. Until Mussolini's rise to power, the nation was on one side and the worker on the other, and the latter had no part in it. I discovered the resurgence of the corporations and studied them in depth. However, Perón also cautioned that only some elements of European fascism can be praised, as the Italian and German regimes otherwise led to "administrative centralization carried to the extreme; the absorption of all private or semiprivate entities (cultural association, universities, etc.); absolute militarism; a closed and directed economy." Robert D. Classweller argued: "Peronism was not fascism. Some of Peronism's adherents had a fascist outlook and mentality. Perón himself admired Mussolini and the idea of the corporate state. But all this was relatively superficial. No fascist society was ever erected on a mass base of laboring and dispossessed hordes. In its own descriptions of identity, Peronism rejected the Fascist parallel. It was more intimately grounded in the national history and ethos than was any European fascism. The structure of the Peronist state after the constitutional amendments of 1949 remained that of the old Argentine democratic order." Perón subverted freedom of speech and silenced vocal dissidents through actions such as nationalizing the broadcasting system and monopolizing the supply of newspaper print. At times, Perón also resorted to tactics such as imprisoning opposition politicians and journalists, including Radical Civic Union leader Ricardo Balbín; and shutting down opposition papers, such as La Prensa. However, most scholars argue against seeing Peronism as dictatorial or totalitarian. Crassweller wrote on Peronism: "Peronism was not a dictatorship. As the American embassy stated in April 1948, ". . . Peron is far from being a dictator in the sense of having absolute authority." The army concerned itself with foreign policy. Totalitarian methods frequently appeared in the operations of the police, or in repression of the press, or in restrictions imposed on the conduct of opposition, but this falls short of a dictatorship. Perón often had to bargain for support, to trim his sails on the timing of initiatives, and to balance interests that could not be overridden. Strong and authoritarian and sometimes oppressive, yes. But not really dictatorial." Paul Corner and Jie-Hyun Lim similarly argued: "Peronism (like early Cold War populism as a whole) was not a dictatorship but an authoritarian form of democracy." Paola Raffaelli wrote: "Although some authors suggest that Peronism was a form of fascism, this was not the case. He was democratically elected and other parties and the Parliament were not banned, it did not pursue an ideology apart from a less-dependant nation, and Perón was in power three times for ten years within a twenty-eight years period of time." Some historians also note that accusations of fascism against Perón originated from Anglo-American circles, who saw Peronism as a threat to their interests in Argentina. Pablo Aguirre argued: "Traditionally Britain in general and the Labour Party in particular have taken little interest in the affairs of Latin America. For years after the Second World War the continent was strictly terra incognita. Analysis based on ignorance was often faulty. General Peron, for example, who "stole" Britain's railways and increased the price of "British" beef, was regarded as the reincarnation of Mussolini." Judith Alder Hellman also noted that those who accused Perón of fascism tend to equate communism and fascism as similar or identical ideologies - Spruille Braden, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs of the United States who spearheaded a campaign to portray Peronism as a fascist movement, later "frankly admitted that he could never see the difference between Fascism and Communism".

=== Protection of Nazi war criminals === After World War II, Argentina became a haven for Nazi war criminals, with explicit protection from Perón, who even shortly before his death commented on the Nuremberg Trials:

In Nuremberg at that time something was taking place that I personally considered a disgrace and an unfortunate lesson for the future of humanity. I became certain that the Argentine people also considered the Nuremberg process a disgrace, unworthy of the victors, who behaved as if they hadn't been victorious. Now we realize that they [the Allies] deserved to lose the war. Author Uki Goñi alleges that Axis Power collaborators, including Pierre Daye, met with Perón at Casa Rosada, the President's official executive mansion. The Swiss Chief of Police Heinrich Rothmund and the Croatian priest Krunoslav Draganović also helped organize the ratline. An investigation of 22,000 documents by the DAIA in 1997 discovered that the network was managed by Rodolfo Freude who had an office in the Casa Rosada and was close to Eva Perón's brother, Juan Duarte. According to Ronald Newton, Ludwig Freude, Rodolfo's father, was probably the local representative of the Office Three secret service headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, with probably more influence than the German ambassador Edmund von Thermann. He had met Perón in the 1930s, and had contacts with Generals Juan Pistarini, Domingo Martínez, and José Molina. Ludwig Freude's house became the meeting place for Nazis and Argentine military officers supporting the Axis. In 1943, he traveled with Perón to Europe to attempt an arms deal with Germany.

After the war, Ludwig Freude was investigated over his connection to possible looted Nazi art, cash and precious metals on deposit at two Argentine banks, Banco Germanico and Banco Tornquist. But on 6 September 1946, the Freude investigation was terminated by presidential decree. Examples of Nazis and collaborators who relocated to Argentina include Emile Dewoitine, who arrived in May 1946 and worked on the Pulqui jet; Erich Priebke, who arrived in 1947; Josef Mengele in 1949; Adolf Eichmann in 1950; Austrian representative of the Škoda arms manufacturer in Spain Reinhard Spitzy; Charles Lescat, editor of Je Suis Partout in Vichy France; and SS functionary Ludwig Lienhardt. Many members of the notorious Croatian Ustaše (including their leader, Ante Pavelić) took refuge in Argentina, as did Milan Stojadinović, the former Serbian Prime Minister of monarchist Yugoslavia. In 1946 Stojadinović went to Rio de Janeiro, and then to Buenos Aires, where he was reunited with his family. Stojadinović spent the rest of his life as presidential advisor on economic and financial affairs to governments in Argentina and founded the financial newspaper El Economista in 1951, which still carries his name on its masthead. A Croatian priest, Krunoslav Draganović, organizer of the San Girolamo ratline, was authorized by Perón to assist Nazi operatives to come to Argentina and evade prosecution in Europe after World War II, in particular the Ustaše. Ante Pavelić became a security advisor of Perón. After Perón was overthrown in 1955, Pavelić, fearing extradition to Yugoslavia, left for Francoist Spain in 1957.

As in the United States (Operation Paperclip), Argentina also welcomed displaced German scientists such as Kurt Tank and Ronald Richter. Some of these refugees took important roles in Perón's Argentina, such as French collaborationist Jacques de Mahieu, who became an ideologue of the Peronist movement, before becoming mentor to a Roman Catholic nationalist youth group in the 1960s. Belgian collaborationist Pierre Daye became editor of a Peronist magazine. Rodolfo Freude, Ludwig's son, became Perón's chief of presidential intelligence in his first term. Recently, Goñi's research, drawing on investigations in Argentine, Swiss, American, British and Belgian government archives, as well as numerous interviews and other sources, was detailed in The Real ODESSA: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón's Argentina (2002), showing how escape routes known as ratlines were used by former NSDAP members and like-minded people to escape trial and judgment. Goñi places particular emphasis on the part played by Perón's government in organizing the ratlines, as well as documenting the aid of Swiss and Vatican authorities in their flight. The Argentine consulate in Barcelona gave false passports to fleeing Nazi war criminals and collaborationists. Recently declassified files from Brazil and Chile reveal that during WWII Péron sold 10,000 blank Argentine passports to ODESSA – the organisation set up to protect former SS men in the event of defeat. Tomás Eloy Martínez, writer and professor of Latin American studies at Rutgers University, wrote that Juan Perón allowed Nazis into the country in hopes of acquiring advanced German technology developed during the war. Martínez also noted that Eva Perón played no part in allowing Nazis into the country. However, one of Eva's bodyguards was in fact an ex-Nazi commando named Otto Skorzeny, who had met Juan on occasion. Perón's biographer Jill Hedges wrote on Perón's attitude and actions regarding the Nazi immigration to Argentina:

Unquestionably the Perón government, like others elsewhere, received former Nazis after the war, not least in a bid to attract skilled scientists and technicians; Perón himself would describe this as 'good business', saying 'what costs us a plane ticket cost Germany millions of marks invested in training those scientists and technicians'. Many also found their way to Argentina through the offices of the Vatican and, in some cases, through the willingness of some Argentine diplomats in Europe to sell them Argentine passports. Later investigations in the 1990s would identify 180 Nazis and collaborators who entered Argentina after the war, of whom around 50 were identified as war criminals, notably including Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele (with whom Perón had at least one conversation about his genetic experiments). This represented indifference rather than Nazi ideology on Perón or the government's part.